Foreign policy and the wars

The first principle

A newly independent, poor and militarily weak country in a world split between two blocs has two needs: to keep its freedom of choice, and to secure its borders. Nehru's foreign policy put the first need at the centre through non alignment, betting that moral standing, Afro Asian solidarity and good relations with both blocs would also keep India safe. The wars of 1947 to 1971 tested that bet. The defeat of 1962 showed that idealism without military strength was not enough, and the victory of 1971 showed that non alignment could coexist with hard power and a well chosen partnership.

The core

Foundations of Nehru's foreign policy

• Non alignment. India would join neither the United States led nor the Soviet led bloc and would judge each issue on its merits. This was not neutrality, since India took clear positions, but a claim to independent judgement.
• Anti colonialism and anti racism. India hosted the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, backed Indonesian independence and opposed apartheid in South Africa.
• Peaceful coexistence. The Panchsheel, or five principles, were written into the agreement of 29 April 1954 with China on trade with the Tibet region: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
• Afro Asian solidarity. The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the founding summit of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) at Belgrade in 1961, with Tito, Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah, built a bloc of new nations.
• Mediation and the United Nations. India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (1953), opposed the Anglo French invasion of Suez (1956) and sent troops on United Nations peacekeeping missions.
• Pragmatism. India stayed in the Commonwealth as a republic under the London Declaration of 1949 and took economic aid from both blocs.

The Kashmir war, 1947 to 1948

Tribal raiders backed by Pakistan entered Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947; the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October and Indian troops were flown in the next day. India referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council on 1 January 1948, and a ceasefire took effect on 1 January 1949. The UN reference turned a question of aggression into an international dispute, which many later saw as a costly choice.

The China war of 1962

• Causes. China disputed India's boundary in two sectors: Aksai Chin in Ladakh, Indian territory across which China built a road linking Xinjiang and Tibet in the 1950s, and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now Arunachal Pradesh, where China rejected the McMahon Line. India's grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959 deepened mistrust, and clashes followed. From 1961 India's forward policy set up small posts in frontier areas that China claimed, without the strength to hold them.
• Course. China attacked in both sectors on 20 October 1962. In NEFA, Tawang, Se La and Bomdila fell, while in Ladakh posts such as Rezang La fought to the last. China declared a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November.
• Consequences. Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon resigned, defence spending rose, the army expanded with new mountain divisions, the Indo Tibetan Border Police was raised, and India sought arms from the West. The Henderson Brooks and Bhagat inquiry into the military failure has not been officially released.

The 1965 war with Pakistan

Clashes in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 ended in a tribunal award in 1968. In August Pakistan sent armed infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir under Operation Gibraltar, expecting a local uprising that did not happen; India crossed the international border towards Lahore in September, and a ceasefire followed on 23 September. Soviet mediation produced the Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966, under which both sides withdrew to pre war positions; Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri died at Tashkent the next day.

Dimensions

• Strategic. After 1962 India learned that security needed military strength, and it began defence planning with five year defence plans.
• Diplomatic. Non alignment gave India a voice beyond its power in the 1950s, but the 1962 war showed that friends would help only on their own terms, and India's tilt towards the Soviet Union grew after 1965.
• Political. The 1962 defeat weakened Nehru, while the 1971 victory gave Indira Gandhi great authority, which fed the concentration of power that followed.
• Economic. Wars, droughts and aid cuts in 1965 to 1966 strained the Plans and pushed India towards food self reliance and the Green Revolution.

In practice

The 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh

• Background. The Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won a majority in Pakistan's elections of December 1970, but power was not transferred. The military crackdown in East Pakistan from 25 March 1971 drove about one crore refugees into West Bengal, Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam.
• Diplomacy. India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971, which balanced the United States and China, who backed Pakistan. Indira Gandhi toured Western capitals to explain the refugee burden.
• War. After Pakistani air strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December, India fought on two fronts. In the east, Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini reached Dhaka, where about 93,000 Pakistani troops surrendered on 16 December 1971; in the west, battles such as Longewala and naval strikes on Karachi held Pakistan back.
• Settlement. The Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972 committed both countries to settle differences bilaterally and peacefully and to respect the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971.

Pokhran, 1974

On 18 May 1974 India conducted an underground nuclear test at Pokhran, which it called a peaceful nuclear explosion. It showed technical capability and independence of choice, but it led to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and years of technology denial.

Issues and way forward

• Was non alignment naive? Critics argue that Nehru's trust in Panchsheel left India unprepared in 1962; defenders reply that a poor country could not afford an arms race and that non alignment won aid and respect from both blocs. The balanced view is that the principle was sound but was not backed by defence preparedness.
• The forward policy. Historians debate whether it provoked China or merely asserted Indian claims; most agree that political decisions ran ahead of military capacity, which is why civil and military coordination became a lasting lesson.
• Opaque records. The Henderson Brooks and Bhagat report remains classified; historians and some former officials have argued for declassification so that lessons are learned openly.
• From non alignment to strategic autonomy. The 1971 treaty with Moscow showed that India could take partners without joining a bloc, which is the root of today's idea of strategic autonomy and multi alignment.

Common confusions

• Panchsheel and NAM. Panchsheel (1954) was a set of principles in a bilateral agreement with China; NAM (1961) was a multilateral movement of states outside the blocs.
• Tashkent and Simla. Tashkent (1966) followed the 1965 war through Soviet mediation; Simla (1972) followed the 1971 war and stressed bilateralism.
• Non alignment and neutrality. A neutral state stays out of disputes; a non aligned state takes positions but refuses to join military blocs.
• Aksai Chin and NEFA. Aksai Chin is the western sector in Ladakh; NEFA is the eastern sector, now Arunachal Pradesh.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: non alignment, Panchsheel, Bandung, Non Aligned Movement, Commonwealth, UN reference, forward policy, McMahon Line, Aksai Chin, NEFA, Henderson Brooks report, Operation Gibraltar, Tashkent Declaration, Indo Soviet Treaty, Simla Agreement, Pokhran.
• Previous year questions: Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction (data): In 1971 about one crore refugees crossed into India from East Pakistan, turning a neighbour's crisis into India's war.
  • Introduction (judgement, quote or report): The Panchsheel agreement of 1954 promised peaceful coexistence with China, yet eight years later the two countries were at war.
  • Conclusion: India's early foreign policy secured independence of choice in a bipolar world, and the wars taught that this independence must rest on military and economic strength.
  • Conclusion: From Panchsheel to Simla, India moved from idealism to a realism that still kept non alignment's core aim, the freedom to decide its own course.