Parliamentary accountability and committees

The first principle

In a parliamentary system the executive is drawn from the legislature and survives only as long as it keeps the confidence of the elected House. That fusion is efficient, because the government can get its laws passed, but it carries a danger: a government with a disciplined majority can turn Parliament into a forum that approves rather than examines. Accountability therefore depends on two things, the daily tools that force ministers to answer in the House, and committees that examine in detail what the floor of the House has no time to examine.

The core

Collective responsibility

• The rule. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. Ministers stand or fall together, a decision of the Cabinet binds every minister, and a government that loses a vote of confidence must resign.
• Why it works through the House. Because the Lok Sabha can remove the government, every question, motion and committee report carries the weight of that ultimate sanction, even when it is not used.

The tools on the floor of the House

• Question Hour. The first hour of a sitting is for questions: starred questions get an oral answer with supplementaries, unstarred ones a written answer, and short notice questions deal with urgent matters. It is the most direct daily check on ministers.
• Zero Hour. The time after Question Hour, used since the early 1960s, lets members raise urgent matters without notice. It is an Indian practice, not found in the rules.
• Calling attention and adjournment motions. A calling attention notice makes a minister reply on an urgent public matter. An adjournment motion, which needs the support of 50 members, sets aside the day's business to discuss a definite matter and implies censure, so it is not allowed in the Rajya Sabha.
• No confidence and censure. A no confidence motion under Rule 198 needs 50 members to support its admission, need not state reasons, and if passed forces the government out. A censure motion must state its charges and condemns a policy or minister without necessarily removing the government.
• Financial tools. During the Demands for Grants, members can move cut motions: a policy cut (reduce the demand to one rupee), an economy cut, or a token cut of 100 rupees to voice a grievance.
• Follow up. The Committee on Government Assurances checks whether promises made by ministers on the floor have been kept.

Why committees

• Time and expertise. The House sits for fewer than a hundred days in most years and cannot examine every Bill, budget head or audit report. Small committees can call officials, take evidence from experts, and study documents line by line.
• Less partisan. Committees meet in private, their members are drawn from all parties in proportion to their strength, and their reports are often unanimous, which allows a degree of agreement that is rare on the floor.

The financial committees

• Public Accounts Committee (PAC). It has 22 members, 15 from the Lok Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha, elected each year by proportional representation, and since 1967 it has been chaired by a member of the Opposition. It examines the appropriation and finance accounts and the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), asking whether money was spent as Parliament intended, legally and with propriety. Its examination of spectrum allocation after the CAG report of 2010 shows how audit findings become political accountability, though its scrutiny comes after the money is spent and its recommendations are advisory.
• Estimates Committee. It has 30 members, all from the Lok Sabha. It examines the estimates of selected ministries and suggests economies, better organisation and alternative policies within the policy Parliament has approved, which is why it is called a "continuous economy committee".
• Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU). It has 22 members, 15 from the Lok Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha, and examines the working of public sector undertakings and the CAG's reports on them.

Departmentally Related Standing Committees

• Structure. Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) were set up in 1993 and have numbered 24 since 2004. Each has 31 members, 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha, and covers a group of ministries; ministers cannot be members.
• Work. They examine the Demands for Grants of their ministries during the budget recess, Bills referred to them by the Speaker or Chairman, annual reports, and long term policy documents. Their reports are advisory, but the government must report the action it has taken on them.
• Example. The Joint Committee on the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 suggested so many changes that the government withdrew the Bill in 2022 and brought a new one, which became the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Joint and select committees of this kind work alongside the DRSCs.

Dimensions

Cabinet dominance and the decline of parliamentary supremacy

• The efficient secret. Walter Bagehot called the close union of executive and legislature, through the Cabinet, the "efficient secret" of the English constitution, and Ivor Jennings described the Cabinet as the core of the British system. India inherited this design, and with it the risk that the Cabinet, not Parliament, becomes the real centre of power.
• Party discipline. The Tenth Schedule disqualifies a member who votes against the party whip, so a government with a majority can be sure of every vote.
• Bypassing the House. Ordinances, the use of the money Bill route to avoid the Rajya Sabha, and the guillotine, under which most Demands for Grants are passed on the last day without discussion, reduce Parliament's control over law and money.
• Fewer sittings. The 17th Lok Sabha (2019 to 2024) held 274 sittings, the fewest of any full term Lok Sabha, according to PRS Legislative Research (PRS).

The individual member as law maker

• Whips and the Tenth Schedule. Because a member who defies the whip loses the seat, a member cannot vote by conscience or constituency interest, so debate rarely changes votes and preparation for it loses its point.
• Private members' Bills. Only 14 private members' Bills have become law since 1952, the last being the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The Rajya Sabha passed the Rights of Transgender Persons Bill, 2014, a private member's Bill, but it was not enacted in that form.
• Disruptions and little research support. Time lost to disruption cuts Question Hour and debate, and members have no personal research staff; the Legislative Assistants to Members of Parliament (LAMP) fellowship run by PRS is a small private effort to fill the gap.
• Effect. The result is shorter debates, Bills passed in minutes, and a Parliament whose quality depends on a few members rather than the House as a whole.

In practice

• Referral is falling. The share of Bills referred to committees has fallen steeply since 2014, as the chart shows, so most Bills now reach the statute book without detailed scrutiny.

Source: PRS Legislative Research

• No confidence motions. Motions in 2018 and 2023 were defeated, as expected with a clear majority, but both forced a long debate in which the government had to answer on issues it had avoided, which is the motion's real use under a majority government.
• Institutionalisation through committees. The PAC and the Estimates Committee have built a body of reports, action taken reports and conventions over seven decades, so the scrutiny of public money no longer depends on the will of the government of the day.

Issues and way forward

• Too few sittings. The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002 recommended at least 120 sittings a year for the Lok Sabha and 100 for the Rajya Sabha; a fixed annual calendar would make this enforceable.
• Committee scrutiny is optional. Referral depends on the Speaker or Chairman. Making referral of every Bill to a committee the rule, except for urgent Bills with recorded reasons, would restore scrutiny without adding a veto.
• No independent financial analysis. A Parliamentary Budget Office, on the lines of the Congressional Budget Office of the United States, would give members their own analysis of budgets and Bills.
• Rigid whips. Relaxing the anti defection law so that it applies only to votes of confidence and money Bills would let members speak and vote freely on other laws while keeping governments stable.
• Weak follow up. Committee reports should be debated in the House, and action taken reports should be tracked publicly.

Common confusions

• No confidence and censure motion. A no confidence motion needs no reasons and removes the government if passed; a censure motion must give reasons and condemns, but need not lead to resignation.
• PAC and Estimates Committee. The PAC looks back at money already spent, using the CAG's audit; the Estimates Committee looks at estimates for the current year and suggests economies.
• Standing and ad hoc committees. Standing committees, like the PAC and the DRSCs, are permanent; ad hoc committees, such as a select or joint committee on a Bill, end when they report.
• Zero Hour and Question Hour. Question Hour is governed by rules and notice; Zero Hour is an informal practice without notice.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: collective responsibility, Article 75(3), Question Hour, Zero Hour, adjournment motion, no confidence motion, cut motion, Public Accounts Committee, Estimates Committee, Departmentally Related Standing Committees, referral of Bills, guillotine, efficient secret, private member's Bill, NCRWC.
• Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: "Only 16 per cent of Bills introduced in the 17th Lok Sabha were referred to committees, against 71 per cent in the 15th, according to PRS Legislative Research."
  • Introduction with a quote: "Walter Bagehot called the fusion of executive and legislature the 'efficient secret' of parliamentary government; in India, that fusion now leans heavily towards the executive."
  • Conclusion: "Parliament's ability to hold the executive to account rests less on dramatic motions than on regular sittings, an active Question Hour and committees whose work the House takes seriously."
  • Conclusion: "Mandatory committee referral, a fixed calendar and freer votes for members would restore Parliament from a forum of approval to a forum of scrutiny."