The Governor

The first principle

The Governor wears two hats. In the state, the Governor is a constitutional head who acts on the advice of an elected government, exactly as the President does in Delhi; but the Governor is also appointed by the Union and holds office at its pleasure, so the office is the one point at which the Union sits inside the state's own machinery. When the two roles are kept apart, the office links the federation together; when the second hat is worn over the first, the Governor becomes the most contested office in Centre state relations.

The core

Appointment and tenure

• Articles 153 to 159. Every state has a Governor, though one person may be Governor of two or more states (Seventh Amendment, 1956). The President appoints the Governor by warrant (Article 155); the Governor must be a citizen of at least 35 years, may hold no other office of profit, and takes oath before the Chief Justice of the High Court.
• At the pleasure of the President. The term is five years, but the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President (Article 156), which in practice means the Union Council of Ministers. There is no fixed procedure or ground for removal in the text.
• B. P. Singhal v Union of India (2010). A Constitution Bench held that though the pleasure doctrine needs no reasons, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. A Governor cannot be removed merely because a new party has come to power at the Centre or because the Governor disagrees with its policies, and the removal is open to limited judicial review.

Aid and advice, and discretion

• Article 163. There is a Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister to aid and advise the Governor, except where the Constitution requires the Governor to act in discretion. Under Article 163(2) the Governor's own decision on whether a matter is discretionary is final, and under Article 163(3) courts cannot inquire into the advice given.
• Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab (1974). A seven judge bench held that the President and Governors are constitutional heads who act on ministerial advice save in a few well known exceptional situations.
• Nabam Rebia (2016). In the Arunachal Pradesh case a Constitution Bench held that the Governor's discretion is limited to matters expressly provided or arising by necessary implication. The Governor could not advance the Assembly session on his own, and has no role in disputes inside the legislature party.
• Express discretion. The text gives discretion in a few places: reserving a Bill for the President (Article 200), reporting a breakdown of constitutional machinery (Article 356), acting as administrator of an adjoining Union territory (Article 239(2)), deciding the share of mineral royalty payable to autonomous district councils under the Sixth Schedule, and the special responsibilities under Article 371 (for example, law and order in Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh).
• Situational discretion. Discretion also arises from circumstance: choosing a Chief Minister when no party has a clear majority, dismissing a ministry that has lost its majority but refuses to resign, and dissolving the Assembly when no government can be formed. In Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment v State of Madhya Pradesh (2004) the Court held that the Governor may sanction the prosecution of a minister against cabinet advice where that advice is plainly biased.

Dimensions

Legislative powers: ordinances

• Conditions under Article 213. The Governor may promulgate an ordinance only when the Legislative Assembly, or both Houses where there is a Council, is not in session, and only when satisfied that circumstances require immediate action. The ordinance is made on ministerial advice and has the same force and limits as an Act of the legislature.
• Instructions of the President. The Governor cannot issue an ordinance without the President's instructions if an equivalent Bill would need the President's previous sanction for introduction, or would have to be reserved, or would be invalid without the President's assent.
• Life of an ordinance. It must be laid before the legislature and lapses six weeks after it reassembles, unless approved earlier or withdrawn. Since the legislature must meet at least once in six months, the longest life of an ordinance is about six months and six weeks.
• D. C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar (1987). Bihar had re promulgated 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981, some kept alive for over a decade. The Court held that re promulgation as a routine is a fraud on the Constitution and a subversion of the democratic process.
• Krishna Kumar Singh v State of Bihar (2017). A seven judge bench held that re promulgation without placing the ordinance before the legislature is a fraud on the Constitution, that laying it before the legislature is mandatory, and that the Governor's satisfaction is open to judicial review where it rests on no material or on oblique motives.

Assent to Bills

• Article 200. When a Bill passed by the state legislature is presented, the Governor may give assent, withhold assent, return a Bill (other than a Money Bill) once for reconsideration, or reserve it for the President. If the House passes it again, with or without changes, the Governor cannot withhold assent. Reservation is compulsory for a Bill that would reduce the powers of the High Court.
• Article 201. For a reserved Bill, the President may assent or withhold assent, or direct the Governor to return a non Money Bill to the House, which must reconsider it within six months; the President is not bound to assent even after that.
• State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor (November 2023). The Court held that a Governor who withholds assent must return the Bill to the legislature with a message, and cannot sit on Bills indefinitely, because that would let an unelected head veto the elected House.
• State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025). A two judge bench laid down time limits for action under Article 200 and, using Article 142, treated ten Bills that the Governor had held back as having received assent.
• The Presidential reference (November 2025). On a reference under Article 143, a five judge Constitution Bench advised that courts cannot impose fixed timelines on the Governor or the President, and that there is no "deemed assent". It also held that prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction is open to limited judicial review, in which a court may direct the Governor to decide within a reasonable time without examining the merits of the Bill.

In practice

• Hung Assemblies. Sarkaria set an order of preference: a pre poll alliance with a majority, then the largest single party that can show support, then a post poll coalition whose partners all join the government, then one supported from outside. In Rameshwar Prasad v Union of India (2006) the Court held the 2005 dissolution of the Bihar Assembly unconstitutional, because the Governor's fear of horse trading was not a ground to deny a claim.
• The floor test. S. R. Bommai (1994) held that a majority must be tested on the floor of the House, not in Raj Bhavan. The Court has since ordered early floor tests, as in Karnataka (2018) and Maharashtra (2019), and in Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary (2023) held that the Maharashtra Governor had no objective material in 2022 to doubt the government's majority.
• President's rule. The Governor's report under Article 356 is the usual trigger, which is why the office drew criticism in the decades when Article 356 was used to dismiss opposition governments; Bommai reduced that misuse by making proclamations reviewable.
• University chancellor. Most state university Acts make the Governor chancellor, a statutory role that the Constitution does not give. Disputes over vice chancellor appointments led states such as Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu to pass Bills to reduce or remove the Governor's role.

Issues and way forward

• An agent of the Centre. Because the Governor is appointed and removed by the Union, Governors are often seen as political appointees. Sarkaria (1988) recommended an eminent person from outside the state, not active in politics in the recent past, appointed after consulting the Chief Minister; the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) (2002), chaired by M. N. Venkatachaliah, also favoured consultation with the Chief Minister.
• Insecure tenure. Punchhi (2010) proposed a fixed five year term and removal only by a resolution of the state legislature, on the pattern of impeachment, so that a Governor is neither a favourite of the Centre nor a hostage to it.
• Delay on Bills. Sarkaria wanted reservation of Bills for the President used only in rare cases, and Punchhi suggested that a Governor decide on a Bill within six months. The November 2025 opinion now places the remedy in limited judicial review instead of fixed deadlines, which leaves it to convention and restraint.
• Statutory roles. Punchhi recommended that the Governor not be burdened with posts such as chancellor, which drag the office into state politics.

Common confusions

• Withholding and returning. After the 2023 Punjab judgement, withholding assent is not a pocket veto; the Bill goes back to the House. Returning a Bill for reconsideration can be done only once.
• Ordinance and re promulgation. A fresh ordinance on new facts is valid; re promulgating the same ordinance repeatedly to avoid the legislature is not.
• Governor and President. The President's discretion is narrower: the Constitution gives the Governor express discretion in several places, but Article 74 has no equivalent of Article 163(2).

For the exam

• Keyword bank: Article 163, aid and advice, express and situational discretion, pleasure doctrine, B. P. Singhal, Shamsher Singh, Nabam Rebia, Article 213, re promulgation, Krishna Kumar Singh, Article 200, reservation for the President, Presidential reference 2025, floor test, Punchhi Commission.
• Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: "Between 1967 and 1981 Bihar re promulgated 256 ordinances, some kept alive for over a decade, a practice the Supreme Court called a fraud on the Constitution in D. C. Wadhwa (1987)."
  • Introduction with a judgement: "In B. P. Singhal (2010) the Supreme Court held that the Governor is not an employee or agent of the Union, and cannot be removed merely for being out of step with its policies."
  • Conclusion: "The Governor was meant to be a bridge between the Union and the states; that role depends less on new rules than on the convention that the office acts on the advice of the elected government except where the Constitution plainly says otherwise."
  • Conclusion: "Implementing Sarkaria and Punchhi on appointment and tenure, and settling Bills within a reasonable time, would restore the office as a constitutional head rather than a political actor."