8 Sep 2026GS2Topic
Polity: the Constitution, representation, pressure groups and regulatory bodies
Original questions
5 for today1 · First Principles IAS original15 marks250 words
Explain the procedure prescribed under Article 368 for amending the Constitution. A recent Constitution Amendment Bill secured a clear majority of members voting, yet failed to pass. Explain the reason, and examine whether the special majority requirement strikes the right balance between flexibility and rigidity.
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Article 368 sets out the amending procedure. There is no separate constituent body, and Parliament amends as it legislates.
The procedure
Where it begins: A bill may start in either House. A state legislature cannot introduce one.
The special majority: A majority of the total membership, and two thirds of those present and voting.
No joint sitting: A deadlock cannot be resolved the way an ordinary bill is.
Ratification for some: Half the states must agree where federal provisions are altered.
Assent is automatic: The 24th Amendment made presidential assent obligatory.
Why a majority of those voting is not enough
Two separate thresholds: A bill can clear the two thirds test and still miss the total membership test.
The arithmetic: In a House of 543, at least 272 must vote for it, whatever the turnout.
A recent instance: The simultaneous elections bill was carried 269 to 198 in December 2024.
A majority of those voting: It fell short of the total membership and the two thirds mark.
An older instance: The 64th Amendment Bill, 1989 failed in the Rajya Sabha.
Does the requirement balance flexibility and rigidity
It is flexible enough: More than a hundred amendments have passed since 1950.
Rigid where it matters: Ratification applies only where the federal balance is touched.
The criticism: The 42nd Amendment showed that a large majority can still do great damage.
The real brake is elsewhere: Kesavananda Bharati, 1973 supplied a substantive limit the text did not.
The threshold is a test of political consensus, not of constitutional wisdom. It filters out a thin majority, and nothing more. The stronger check came from the Court.
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Decode
Three demands. Explain the procedure, explain the failure, then judge the design.
Implicit demand
The failure has a precise cause. Two thresholds operate, and both must be crossed.
Architecture
The procedure → why the bill failed → flexibility against rigidity → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: Article 368, the two thresholds, the December 2024 division, the 42nd Amendment and Kesavananda. Money line: it filters out a thin majority, and nothing more.
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The procedure
The proviso to Article 368(2) lists the provisions that need state ratification.
These include the election of the President, the High Courts and the Seventh Schedule.
Ratification needs only a simple majority in half the state legislatures.
Articles 4, 169 and 239A allow certain changes by simple majority, outside Article 368.
Creating or abolishing a legislative council follows that simpler route.
The arithmetic of the special majority
The first test is a majority of the total membership, counted on the sanctioned strength.
Vacancies do not lower this number, so absence works against the bill.
The second test is two thirds of those actually present and voting.
A thin House can therefore clear the second test and fail the first.
In December 2024 the division on simultaneous elections stood at 269 to 198.
The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill then went to a joint committee for examination.
Comparison and criticism
The United States needs two thirds of both Houses. Three fourths of the states must then ratify.
It has managed twenty seven amendments in more than two centuries.
Australia requires a referendum, and most proposals there have failed.
India has amended over a hundred times, which critics read as excessive flexibility.
Defenders reply that a young republic needed room to correct itself.
The 44th Amendment, 1978 is the counter example. It undid the excesses of the 42nd.
2 · First Principles IAS original15 marks250 words
The doctrine of basic structure has been criticised as a judicial invention that limits the constituent power of an elected Parliament. Critically examine this criticism.
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Kesavananda Bharati, 1973 held that Parliament may amend every provision. It may not remake the Constitution. The charge is that judges invented this limit.
The criticism
No textual basis: Article 368 allows addition, variation and repeal of any provision, without exception.
Parliament had already spoken: The 24th Amendment restored the amending power after Golaknath.
Judges set that aside: Thirteen unelected judges limited a power the elected House had just reaffirmed.
No advance notice: Basic features have been named one by one over fifty years.
The boundary keeps moving: A legislature cannot know what it may not touch before it acts.
Why the doctrine has held
Amend is not replace: To amend is to alter something that survives the change.
Constituent power was never given: Article 368 confers a power to amend, not to write a new Constitution.
The danger was real: The 39th Amendment placed the Prime Minister's election beyond challenge.
It went further: The 42nd Amendment barred courts from questioning any amendment at all.
Minerva Mills, 1980: Both provisions fell, since a limited amending power is itself basic.
Sparing use: A few amendments have fallen in fifty years, while over a hundred stood.
What survives of the criticism
Uncertainty is real: The content shifts with the bench that applies the doctrine.
No way to overrule it: No majority in Parliament can displace a feature once declared basic.
The discipline needed: The Court should name the feature and trace it to a provision.
The doctrine was made by judges. It answered a real attempt to end constitutional government. The charge of invention is accurate. The charge of illegitimacy is not.
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Decode
Critically examine a criticism. State it fairly, then test it.
Implicit demand
The criticism has three separate strands. Answer each, rather than the general idea.
Architecture
The doctrine → the criticism → why it has held → what survives → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: Article 368, Golaknath and the 24th Amendment, the 39th and 42nd Amendments, Minerva Mills. Money line: the charge of invention is accurate, the charge of illegitimacy is weak.
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How the doctrine arrived
Shankari Prasad, 1951 and Sajjan Singh, 1965: an amendment is not law under Article 13.
Golaknath, 1967 reversed that and barred amendment of fundamental rights.
The 24th Amendment, 1971 was passed to undo Golaknath.
Kesavananda Bharati, 1973 was decided by thirteen judges, seven to six.
The idea is traced to the German scholar Dietrich Conrad, who lectured in India.
Where it has been applied
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 struck down a clause shielding an election.
Minerva Mills, 1980 struck down clauses 4 and 5 of the 42nd Amendment.
Waman Rao, 1981 fixed 24 April 1973 for reviewing Ninth Schedule laws.
S. R. Bommai, 1994 treated secularism and federalism as basic features.
I. R. Coelho, 2007 confirmed that Ninth Schedule entries can be tested.
NJAC judgment, 2015 added judicial independence in appointments.
The debate
Bangladesh adopted similar reasoning, and Germany writes the limit into its Basic Law.
Critics call it a counter majoritarian device with no democratic sanction.
Supporters point out that the electorate never voted for the emergency amendments.
The doctrine also restrains state governments, since Bommai applied it to Article 356.
Colombia uses a similar idea, calling it substitution of the Constitution.
A middle position asks the Court to name the feature and its textual source.
3 · First Principles IAS original15 marks250 words
Examine the scope of the Election Commission's powers under Article 324. Does the power to prepare electoral rolls extend to ordering a special intensive revision, and what are the limits on that power?
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Article 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission. The words are wide and undefined.
The scope of the power
A reservoir where law is silent: Mohinder Singh Gill, 1978 called it a reserve of power for unprovided situations.
But not against a law: A. C. Jose, 1984 held that the Commission cannot act contrary to an existing statute.
It covers rolls as well as polls: Preparation of the electoral roll is named in the article itself.
Wide in practice: Symbols and the model code rest on this power.
Does it cover an intensive revision
The statute already provides for it: Section 21(3) of the 1950 Act allows a special revision of any roll.
The Court has now settled it: ADR v. Election Commission, 2026 upheld the special intensive revision.
The reasoning: An accurate roll is part of a free and fair election.
The test applied: Proportionality. A legitimate aim, means that are not excessive, and a remedy available.
The limits
Citizenship is not for the Commission: It may examine eligibility, but cannot decide who is a citizen.
That belongs elsewhere: The competent authority under the Citizenship Act decides that question.
Process must be fair: Notice, hearing and an appeal must exist before a name is struck off.
No exclusion by category: Article 325 bars any roll based on religion, race, caste or sex.
Judicial review remains: Wide power is not unreviewable power, as Mohinder Singh Gill itself said.
Article 324 is a wide power, not an unlimited one. It allows the Commission to clean the roll. It does not allow the Commission to decide who belongs to the nation.
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Decode
Three demands. The scope, the specific question on revision, then the limits.
Implicit demand
The limits are the marking half. Anyone can describe the width of Article 324.
Architecture
The text → scope in the cases → does it cover revision → the limits → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: Article 324, Mohinder Singh Gill, A. C. Jose, Section 21(3), the 2026 judgment, Article 325. Money line: it does not allow the Commission to decide who belongs to the nation.
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The scope of the power
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 is the leading case on the width of Article 324.
A. C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, 1984 struck down the use of voting machines before a law allowed them.
Kanhiya Lal Omar, 1985 upheld the Symbols Order as an exercise of this power.
Union of India v. ADR, 2002 required candidates to disclose assets and criminal cases.
T. N. Seshan, 1995 dealt with the equal status of the Commissioners within the body.
The law on electoral rolls
Sections 21 to 25 of the 1950 Act govern preparation and revision of rolls.
Section 21(3) allows a special revision for any constituency, with reasons recorded.
Section 16 disqualifies a person who is not a citizen from being enrolled.
The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 set out the forms and the procedure.
A summary revision is routine. An intensive revision rebuilds the roll from fresh enumeration.
Article 326 guarantees adult suffrage, which is the reason inclusion errors matter most.
The 2026 judgment and the debate
The Court held the exercise legally tenable and not beyond the powers of the Commission.
It stressed that safeguards and appellate remedies must be real, not formal.
It separated eligibility for the roll from any determination of citizenship.
Critics argue that the burden of proof shifts onto the poorest voters.
The counter argument is that a bloated roll damages confidence in the result.
The wider question is whether a national revision can follow the same design.
4 · First Principles IAS original10 marks150 words
Discuss the constitutional and statutory framework governing the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner. Assess whether the present arrangement adequately secures institutional independence.
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Article 324(2) leaves the appointment to the President, subject to a law of Parliament. No such law existed for seventy years.
The framework
The constitutional protection: Article 324(5) gives the Chief the removal security of a Supreme Court judge.
The Court stepped in: Anoop Baranwal, 2023 ordered a panel of three. The Prime Minister, the Opposition leader and the Chief Justice.
Parliament then legislated: The 2023 Act replaced the Chief Justice with a minister named by the Prime Minister.
The result: Two of the three members of the committee come from the government.
Does it secure independence
What it does well: There is now a written law, a fixed term and a defined process.
The core weakness: The executive chooses the person who supervises elections it contests.
Unequal protection remains: Only the Chief has full removal security.
The form of independence is secure and the substance is not. The executive can never be outvoted on the committee that selects the umpire.
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Decode
Two demands. Set out the framework, then assess independence.
Implicit demand
The assessment turns on the composition of the selection committee.
Architecture
The constitutional position → the 2023 judgment → the 2023 Act → assessment → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: Article 324(2) and (5), Anoop Baranwal, the 2023 Act. Money line: the form of independence is secure and the substance is not.
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The framework
Article 324(5) also bars any change in service conditions to a Commissioner's disadvantage.
Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, 2023 filled the gap until Parliament made a law.
The 2023 Act provides a search committee headed by the Law Minister.
The term is six years, or until the age of sixty five, whichever is earlier.
The convention that the senior most Commissioner becomes the Chief has no statutory backing.
Challenges to the 2023 Act have been filed before the Supreme Court.
The independence debate
T. N. Seshan, 1995 confirmed that the Commission is a multi member body.
The Dinesh Goswami Committee wanted the Chief Justice and the Opposition consulted.
The Law Commission, 255th report proposed a collegium for the appointment.
The Second ARC made a similar recommendation on a broad based collegium.
Equal removal protection for all three Commissioners is the most common suggestion.
A cooling off period before any post retirement office is the other.
Comparison
South Africa appoints through a panel including the Chief Justice and civil society.
The United Kingdom requires the Speaker's Committee to approve appointments.
Canada appoints its Chief Electoral Officer by resolution of the House of Commons.
Each of these designs keeps the opposition inside the process, not outside it.
5 · First Principles IAS original10 marks150 words
Discuss the changing character of pressure groups in India in an age of digital mobilisation. Have informal, leaderless formations displaced organised associations in influencing policy?
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A pressure group seeks to influence policy without seeking office. Its form has changed. Its older form has not gone.
What digital mobilisation changed
A campaign now needs a hashtag rather than an office and a membership roll. Numbers also gather faster than any union could manage. The anti corruption movement of 2011 filled grounds within weeks. The net neutrality campaign of 2015 sent a million responses to the regulator. It won.
What it did not change
Policy is still written in rooms that reward standing. CII and FICCI sit in budget and tariff consultations because they supply detail. The Samyukta Kisan Morcha was a coalition of unions, not a crowd. A leaderless campaign has nobody who can sign an agreement. Attention fades, while a registered body survives the news cycle.
Informal formations have not displaced organised associations. They set the agenda, and organised bodies convert it into text. The group that can do both now wins.
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Decode
Discuss the change, then answer a direct question about displacement.
Implicit demand
The answer is no, but a flat no is wrong. Something real has changed.
Architecture
What a pressure group is → what digital changed → what it did not → verdict. Prose suits a question that asks for a judgment.
Articulation
Anchor: the 2011 movement, the net neutrality campaign, CII and FICCI. Money line: they are the front end of the same process.
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The older forms
Business associations such as CII, FICCI and ASSOCHAM are the oldest organised groups.
Trade unions such as INTUC, BMS and CITU are tied to political parties.
Farmer bodies, caste associations and religious organisations all act as pressure groups.
Groups such as ADR and MKSS work through courts and the right to information.
The right to information campaign began with village level accountability work in Rajasthan.
The digital turn
India Against Corruption, 2011 is the first large campaign built on television and social media.
The net neutrality campaign, 2015 produced over a million responses to a consultation paper.
Online petitions, hashtags and crowdfunding lowered the cost of collective action.
The farm law protests of 2020 combined an organised coalition with digital amplification.
Weaknesses are real: no membership, no funds, no continuity after the moment passes.
Attention moves quickly, and a leaderless group cannot hold it.
How influence actually works
The Pre Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 puts draft bills in the public domain.
Standing committees take evidence from associations more often than from campaigns.
Litigation is now a major route, and it needs a registered body to file.
Regulators run formal consultations, which reward a written technical response.
The strongest recent campaigns have had both a public face and an organised core.