18 Sep 2026GS2Topic
International relations
Original questions
5 for today1 · First Principles IAS original10 marks150 words
India assumes the BRICS chair in 2026 at a time when the grouping has expanded faster than its coherence. Examine the challenges and India's priorities as chair.
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India chaired BRICS in 2026 and hosted the eighteenth summit in New Delhi this September. Eleven members hold about 49.5 per cent of world population and 40 per cent of output in purchasing power terms. Their share of world trade is only 26 per cent.
The challenges
Weight without integration: That gap shows a group large in size yet weakly connected internally.
Two theories of purpose: Russia and Iran seek a counterweight to the West, while India and Brazil seek reform within it.
India's priorities
Reform rather than rivalry: The New Delhi Declaration, a consensus text of about 140 paragraphs, pressed for Security Council and quota reform.
Institutions over rhetoric: The New Development Bank approved about 43 billion dollars across 139 projects by end 2025.
BRICS has grown in size faster than in purpose, since internal trade remains a fraction of its weight. India used the chair to press reform of the existing order rather than rivalry with it.
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Decode
Two demands: the challenges created by expansion, and India's priorities as chair.
Implicit demand
The stem supplies the argument, so quantify why size has outrun coherence.
Architecture
Scale with data → challenges → India's priorities → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: 49.5 per cent of population against 26 per cent of trade, China's share of output, the New Delhi Declaration, the New Development Bank record. Money line: grown in size faster than in purpose.
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The numbers worth carrying
The eighteenth summit met at New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026 under India's chairship, its fourth after 2012, 2016 and 2021.
Members hold about 49.5 per cent of world population and roughly 40 per cent of global output measured at purchasing power parity.
The group accounts for about 26 per cent of world trade and around 36 per cent of the earth's land area.
Intra BRICS merchandise trade rose from 84 billion dollars in 2003 to about 1.17 trillion dollars in 2024.
China contributes close to two thirds of the group's combined output in nominal terms.
The New Development Bank had approved about 43 billion dollars across 139 projects by the end of 2025.
China alone contributes close to two thirds of the group's combined output, so agenda setting tilts towards Beijing.
The membership
Members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Indonesia.
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the Emirates joined on 1 January 2024, and Indonesia followed in 2025.
Argentina declined membership after its change of government.
A partner country category was created at Kazan in 2024, and about ten states hold that status.
China was endorsed as chair for 2027.
The group has no secretariat or treaty, so continuity rests entirely on the annual chair.
The tensions and India's line
India and China remain in a difficult bilateral relationship while sitting in the same grouping.
Saudi Arabia was invited in 2023 and its participation has remained ambiguous.
India has consistently said it has no interest in a common currency or in displacing the dollar.
The Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the development bank remain the group's only institutions.
India frames BRICS as a voice of the Global South rather than as an anti western platform.
Counter terrorism language in BRICS declarations has strengthened largely at India's insistence.
2 · First Principles IAS original10 marks150 words
Political transitions in two neighbouring countries have opened a window for India to recast its regional relationships. Examine the opportunities and the risks.
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Bangladesh voted on 12 February 2026, and Tarique Rahman took office within a week. Nepal elected Balendra Shah in March, after the protests of 2025. Both governments arrived owing nothing to Delhi.
The opportunities
A counterpart with authority: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) holds a two thirds majority, so it can spend political capital on hard files.
Pending files become movable: Teesta water sharing has waited since 2011, and transit and power trade turn on political will alone.
The risks
Extradition of the former prime minister: Dhaka seeks Sheikh Hasina after her conviction in 2025, and Delhi has not agreed.
Distance from Delhi has electoral value: Both leaders rose partly on resentment of India's closeness to their predecessors.
The field is contested: China and Pakistan have deepened engagement with Dhaka since 2024.
The window is real but narrow, since each leader must show independence from Delhi in the first year. India gains more from delivering on water, power and trade than from seeking political assurances.
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Decode
Two demands: the opportunities and the risks created by the transition.
Implicit demand
The countries are unnamed, so identify them and date the changes before analysing.
Architecture
What changed, with dates → opportunities → risks → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: the February and March elections, the BNP majority, Teesta since 2011, the extradition demand. Money line: delivery matters more than assurances.
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What changed
Sheikh Hasina was ousted in August 2024 after a student led uprising, and left for India.
An interim government under Muhammad Yunus governed for about eighteen months.
Bangladesh voted on 12 February 2026, with turnout of about sixty per cent.
It was the first national election contested without the Awami League.
In Nepal, protests in September 2025 brought down the government of K. P. Sharma Oli.
Balendra Shah, formerly mayor of Kathmandu, became prime minister in March 2026.
The agenda with Bangladesh
The Teesta sharing agreement has been pending since 2011.
India shares over ninety per cent of Bangladesh's land border, which makes stability a direct interest.
Power trade, rail links and inland waterways are already working and can be expanded.
Attacks on Hindu minorities during the interim period damaged public opinion in India.
Hasina was convicted in November 2025 and sentenced in absentia, which sharpened the extradition demand.
The agenda with Nepal
A government elected after the 2025 protests has room to act beyond older party positions.
The boundary question at Kalapani and Lipulekh remains unresolved.
The Eminent Persons Group report has never been formally received by either side.
Hydropower export to India is Nepal's largest economic opportunity.
Recruitment of Gorkha soldiers has been suspended since the change in recruitment rules.
The open border makes trade, labour movement and security a shared concern.
3 · First Principles IAS original10 marks150 words
The Indian diaspora has become both an instrument of influence and a point of vulnerability. Examine.
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About 35.4 million people of Indian origin live abroad, the largest diaspora in the world. They sent home 135.4 billion dollars last year. That is close to three per cent of national income, and more than foreign direct investment.
As an instrument of influence
Finance without obligation: Remittances offset much of the trade deficit, and unlike borrowing they carry no repayment.
Access inside host politics: Persons of Indian origin in legislatures abroad eased engagement, as in the civil nuclear negotiation.
As a point of vulnerability
Migration policy is set elsewhere: Visa quotas and fees in the United States, the largest source of remittances, change without reference to India.
Concentration in the Gulf: Millions work under sponsorship systems with little legal protection, and job nationalisation removes work quickly.
Evacuation is a recurring liability: Ukraine, Sudan and Israel each needed airlifts within three years.
The diaspora is an asset India does not control. Influence follows their success abroad, while vulnerability follows their dependence on other governments.
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Decode
Examine both halves of the claim, and give each its own evidence.
Implicit demand
The same feature produces both effects, which is what makes the statement worth examining.
Architecture
The scale → influence → vulnerability → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: 35 million people, 135 billion dollars in remittances, Gulf employment, the evacuation operations. Money line: an asset India does not control.
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The scale
The Ministry of External Affairs counts about 35.4 million overseas Indians, the largest diaspora in the world.
That divides into roughly 15.9 million non resident Indians and 19.6 million persons of Indian origin.
Remittances reached 135.4 billion dollars in the last financial year, according to the Economic Survey.
India has been the largest recipient of remittances for more than two decades.
The United States is now the single largest source, while the Gulf share has fallen sharply.
Remittances are close to three per cent of national income and need no servicing.
Where influence shows
Technology leadership and investment flow back to India through the same networks.
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas and the Overseas Citizen of India card institutionalised the link.
Diaspora advocacy supported the civil nuclear agreement with the United States.
Indian origin professionals lead several of the largest technology companies in the world.
Student migration has become a channel of soft power and later of remittance.
Diaspora investment in real estate and startups has grown steadily.
Where vulnerability shows
Skilled visa costs and quotas in the United States are decided without reference to India.
Deportations and immigration enforcement abroad create sudden consular crises.
Gulf employment depends on oil prices and on nationalisation of jobs by host states.
The Kafala sponsorship system leaves workers with limited legal protection.
Operation Ganga, Operation Kaveri and Operation Ajay show the recurring cost of evacuation.
Separatist campaigning by sections of the diaspora has strained relations with Canada.
4 · First Principles IAS original15 marks250 words
Evaluate the effectiveness of international mechanisms against terrorism, and examine why India has increasingly relied on bilateral instruments.
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The Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) that India proposed in 1996 remains unadopted. After the Pahalgam attack of April 2025, India's response ran through its own action and its partners. No multilateral body delivered it.
Where the mechanisms do work
Listing carries real cost: United Nations Security Council designations freeze assets and bar travel, as with Masood Azhar in 2019.
Money can be squeezed: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey listing pushed Pakistan into visible action from 2018 to 2022. Financial pressure works better than political censure.
Norms exist and are used: Conventions on financing, hostage taking and nuclear terrorism give states a basis to prosecute.
Where they fail
No agreed definition: The CCIT is stuck on whether state forces and self determination movements fall within it.
One veto is enough: China held up the listing of Masood Azhar for a decade, so one member holds a permanent brake.
Compliance is not verified: The Council can name a person, but no body checks whether a state acts against him.
Technical lists are not punishment: Pakistan left the grey list in 2022 with its groups intact, since compliance is measured by process.
Why India turns to bilateral instruments
They deliver custody and evidence: Extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance produce what resolutions cannot.
Partners can designate directly: The United States listed The Resistance Front after Pahalgam, which no Council listing achieved.
Language can be specific: Bilateral statements named the attack, where wider forums used general wording.
Multilateral machinery sets norms and freezes assets, yet cannot compel a state that shelters a group. India therefore uses it for legitimacy and bilateral instruments for results.
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Decode
Evaluate the mechanisms, then explain the shift to bilateral instruments.
Implicit demand
The second half follows from the first, so the failures must be specific.
Architecture
The gap → where mechanisms work → where they fail → why India goes bilateral → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: CCIT since 1996, the 1267 listings, FATF grey listing, Pahalgam and the designation that followed. Money line: multilateral machinery for legitimacy, bilateral instruments for results.
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The multilateral architecture
India proposed the CCIT at the United Nations in 1996, and it is still under negotiation.
The 1267 Committee maintains the sanctions list for Al Qaeda and Islamic State linked entities.
Thirteen sectoral conventions cover hijacking, hostage taking, financing and nuclear terrorism.
The Counter Terrorism Committee met in Delhi and Mumbai in 2022 and issued a declaration.
India has hosted the No Money for Terror conference on terrorist financing.
FATF placed India in regular follow up after its mutual evaluation, its best category.
Where they fall short
The definitional dispute turns on armed forces of a state and on national liberation movements.
Listing requires consensus in the committee, so a single member can place a hold.
Masood Azhar was listed only in 2019 after repeated blocks over a decade.
Pakistan exited the grey list in 2022 while its designated groups continued to operate.
There is no standing mechanism to verify that a listed person's assets were actually frozen.
Regional bodies such as SAARC have a convention on terrorism that has never been used.
The bilateral turn
Intelligence is shared bilaterally between agencies, not in open multilateral settings.
India has joint working groups on counter terrorism with more than thirty countries.
Extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties are the operative instruments.
Cooperation with the Emirates and Saudi Arabia has produced actual deportations of wanted persons.
Quad and bilateral statements after Pahalgam named the attack directly.
Operation Sindoor in 2025 showed the limits of relying on external pressure alone.
The risk of the bilateral route is that it depends on the politics of each partner.
5 · First Principles IAS original15 marks250 words
Discuss the changing balance of power in the Indian Ocean and assess India's capacity to remain the preferred security partner in the region.
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China now has the largest navy in the world by number of ships. It also has a base at Djibouti and survey vessels working across the Indian Ocean. India remains the resident power, but no longer the only one with reach.
How the balance is shifting
Presence has become continuous: Chinese warships and research ships now operate here through the year, supported by friendly ports.
Ports deliver access without bases: Hambantota, Gwadar and container terminals elsewhere provide logistics and information.
Smaller states have choices: The Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh each weigh competing offers, and they do.
Outside powers are recalibrating: The Chagos settlement of 2025 secured Diego Garcia, while France and Japan seek larger roles.
Where India is strong
Geography and long practice: Almost every route through the region passes India, whose navy has worked these waters longest.
The first responder record: Relief after cyclones, and evacuations from Yemen and Sudan, buy standing that money cannot.
Domain awareness: The Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram hosts liaison officers from many partner navies.
A framework and a format: MAHASAGAR succeeded SAGAR in 2025, and the Colombo Security Conclave gives a regional table.
Where capacity falls short
Hulls and submarines: China fields over three hundred warships against India's roughly one hundred and thirty.
Building takes too long: Shipyard delays and the long wait for new submarines have pushed capability to the right.
Delivery is the weak link: Announced projects in partner countries have often been slow to finish.
India stays the preferred partner because of geography, trust and response rather than numbers. That will hold only while ships, surveillance and promised projects arrive on time.
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Decode
Two demands: the changing balance, then an assessment of India's capacity.
Implicit demand
Preferred partner is a judgment by others, so answer from what the smaller states weigh.
Architecture
The shift → where India is strong → where capacity falls short → verdict.
Articulation
Anchor: Djibouti and survey vessels, Hambantota and Gwadar, the Information Fusion Centre, MAHASAGAR, submarine numbers. Money line: geography, trust and response rather than numbers.
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The Chinese presence
The base at Djibouti, opened in 2017, is China's first overseas military facility.
Hambantota was leased for ninety nine years after a debt restructuring in 2017.
Survey and research vessels map the ocean floor, which has military as well as civilian use.
Sri Lanka imposed a moratorium on foreign research vessels, then eased it.
The China Pakistan Economic Corridor terminates at Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.
Anti piracy deployments since 2008 gave the Chinese navy a standing reason to be present.
India's instruments
MAHASAGAR, announced in 2025, replaced SAGAR as the framing for regional security.
The Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region at Gurugram shares maritime picture data.
The Colombo Security Conclave brings together India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Mauritius.
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and IORA are the wider regional formats.
P-8I aircraft and mission based deployments provide continuous surveillance.
India was the first to respond after the 2004 tsunami and in successive cyclones.
The capacity question
The Chinese navy exceeds India's in hull numbers by a wide margin.
India's conventional submarine fleet is well below the strength approved decades ago.
Project 75I for new submarines has been delayed repeatedly.
A third aircraft carrier has been discussed without a final decision.
The navy's share of the defence budget has not risen with its area of responsibility.
In the Maldives, Indian personnel were withdrawn in 2024 before ties were repaired with a credit line.