India and the United States

The first principle

India and the United States (US) are drawn together by interests that run deep and long: the rise of China, the need for technology and capital, a shared stake in open seas, and a large diaspora. They are held apart by a difference in how each sees partnership, since Washington is used to allies who follow its lead while New Delhi insists on strategic autonomy and a voice of its own. The relationship therefore grows steadily in structure while frictions recur on trade, Russia, Pakistan and migration, and reading it well means separating the durable frame from the passing quarrel.

The core

From estrangement to partnership

• The Cold War gap. Non alignment, the US alliance with Pakistan and its tilt toward Pakistan in 1971, when it sent the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal, kept the two apart, while India grew close to the Soviet Union under the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.
• Sanctions and reset. The US imposed sanctions after the Pokhran nuclear tests of 1998, but talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott followed, and President Clinton's visit in March 2000 opened a new phase; Prime Minister Vajpayee had already called the two countries "natural allies".
• Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004). This agreement opened cooperation in civil nuclear energy, civilian space, high technology trade and missile defence, and prepared the ground for the nuclear deal.
• Civil nuclear agreement (2005 to 2008). The July 2005 joint statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush led to the Hyde Act (2006), the separation of India's civil and military nuclear facilities, a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 and the 123 Agreement in October 2008. It ended India's nuclear isolation without requiring it to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which is why it remains the turning point of the relationship.
• Defence framework. The US named India a Major Defence Partner in 2016, a status unique to India, and granted it Strategic Trade Authorisation 1 (STA 1) in 2018, easing export of sensitive technology on par with close allies. The relationship was raised to a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in 2020.

The foundational agreements

• General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA, 2002) lets the two share classified military information under agreed safeguards.
• Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, 2016) allows each side's forces to use the other's bases for fuel, repair and supplies on a reimbursable basis, without creating basing rights.
• Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, 2018) gives Indian platforms of US origin access to encrypted communications, which allows real time data exchange.
• Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA, 2020) allows sharing of geospatial data for navigation and targeting, and was signed at the 2+2 ministerial dialogue that began in 2018.

Dimensions

• Strategic. Both want a balance of power in the Indo Pacific that no single country dominates, which shows in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Malabar exercise and maritime cooperation, though India will not join an alliance.
• Defence. India's defence purchases from the US have risen from almost nothing before 2008 to more than 20 billion dollars, covering the C 17 and C 130J transport aircraft, P 8I maritime patrol aircraft, Apache and Chinook helicopters and, in October 2024, an agreement for 31 MQ 9B drones. The agreement of June 2023 between GE Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for co production of F414 engines for the Tejas Mark 2 marks a shift from buying to making.
• Technology. The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), launched in 2023, was renamed TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology) in February 2025, and covers semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, space and critical minerals; India also joined the Minerals Security Partnership in 2023.
• Economic. The US has been India's largest trading partner in goods since 2021 to 22 and one of the largest sources of foreign investment, and India runs a trade surplus with it.
• People. More than four million people of Indian origin live in the US, many in technology, medicine and business, and Indian students are the largest group of foreign students there, which gives India a voice in American politics and a steady flow of skills and remittances.

In practice

Friction points

• Russia and CAATSA. The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, 2017) threatens sanctions on countries that buy major Russian arms, and India's 2018 contract for the S 400 air defence system has kept the question of a waiver open, while India's purchases of Russian oil after 2022 have drawn US criticism.
• Trade. The US ended India's benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in June 2019 after disputes over market access, tariffs and data rules. In August 2025 the US imposed a tariff of 25 per cent on Indian goods and then an additional 25 per cent linked to India's purchases of Russian oil, taking the duty on many Indian goods to 50 per cent, which India called unfair and unjustified.
• Migration. The H 1B visa, most of which goes to Indian professionals, is a recurring point of friction, and in September 2025 the US imposed a fee of 100,000 dollars on new H 1B petitions.
• Pakistan and mediation. Warm US engagement with Pakistan's army leadership in 2025, and US claims to have brought about the India Pakistan ceasefire of May 2025, were rejected by India, which holds that the cessation was agreed directly between the two militaries and that it accepts no third party role.
• Values. Reports of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) criticise India, and India rejects them as biased and an interference in internal affairs.

Why the US struggles to place India in its strategy

• India will not be an ally. The US builds its global strategy around treaty allies who accept its lead, while India wants to be a partner with an independent foreign policy: it keeps defence and energy ties with Russia, deals with Iran over Chabahar, and seeks a multipolar world rather than a US led one.
• India's self image. India sees itself as a future pole of power and a voice of the Global South, so it resists being treated as a junior partner or merely as a counterweight to China, and resents conditions on trade or migration that treat it as a dependent economy.
• Examples of the gap. India did not condemn Russia over Ukraine at the United Nations, abstaining on most resolutions; it stayed out of the trade pillar of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework; and it refused to join any arrangement that looks like a military alliance. The US, for its part, has at times paired India with Pakistan and treated India mainly as a market.

US and Russian defence deals and stability in the Indo Pacific

• What US deals bring. Interoperability through the foundational agreements, maritime awareness from platforms such as the P 8I and MQ 9B, technology transfer and co production, and a hedge against dependence on one supplier, all of which strengthen deterrence at sea against China.
• What Russian deals still provide. Most of India's legacy platforms (fighter aircraft, tanks, submarines and the S 400) are Russian, along with spares and upgrades, and Russia has shared sensitive items such as the BrahMos missile and a leased nuclear submarine, which the US has not.
• The balance. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia remains India's largest arms supplier, but its share fell from about three quarters of India's imports in 2009 to 2013 to about a third in 2019 to 2023, while the US, France and Israel gained. Diversification gives India bargaining power, and Indo Pacific stability is served by a stronger, better connected India rather than by a choice between suppliers.

India as an alternative to China

• Supply chains. Under the "China plus one" approach, Apple's suppliers have moved a large share of iPhone production to India, and Micron's assembly and test unit at Sanand in Gujarat, approved in 2023, was the first semiconductor project under the India Semiconductor Mission, while Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes reward manufacturing in India.
• Strategic support. The US backs India's role in the Quad, its Indo Pacific maritime presence and its membership in export control regimes, seeing a strong India as a balance to China's political and economic weight.

• The limit. India welcomes investment but not the role of a front line state, and US tariffs and visa curbs in 2025 showed that economic nationalism in Washington can work against the goal of moving supply chains to India.

Issues and way forward

• Trade. A bilateral trade agreement, which the two agreed in February 2025 to negotiate, would give stability against tariff swings; India should seek a balanced deal that protects farmers and data sovereignty.
• Technology trust. Delivery under TRUST, the F414 engine and semiconductor projects will decide whether the partnership moves from buying to building.
• Managing Russia. India should keep explaining that its Russia ties are about legacy, energy and autonomy, not alignment, and keep diversifying defence supplies.
• Institutions over personalities. The 2+2 dialogue, working groups and diaspora networks keep the relationship steady when leaders disagree, and should be used fully in difficult years.

Common confusions

• Ally and partner. An ally is bound by a treaty of mutual defence, like Japan or Australia with the US; India is a strategic partner with no such obligation, and Major Defence Partner is a status, not an alliance.
• Hyde Act and 123 Agreement. The Hyde Act (2006) is a US law enabling nuclear trade with India; the 123 Agreement (2008) is the bilateral treaty that sets the terms.
• LEMOA and basing rights. LEMOA gives access to supplies and repair on request, not permanent bases.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: natural allies, civil nuclear agreement, NSG waiver, Major Defence Partner, STA 1, LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA, 2+2 dialogue, iCET and TRUST, CAATSA, strategic autonomy, interoperability, China plus one, diaspora.
• Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: "The US is India's largest trading partner in goods, with total goods trade of about 132 billion dollars in 2024 to 25 and a surplus of over 40 billion dollars for India."
  • Introduction with a quote: "Prime Minister Vajpayee called India and the US natural allies, and the civil nuclear agreement of 2008 turned that phrase into a working partnership."
  • Conclusion: "The relationship is strongest when the US treats India as an independent pole that shares its interests, not as an ally that must share its positions."
  • Conclusion: "Defence, technology and people now anchor the partnership so firmly that disputes over trade and migration can strain it but are unlikely to reverse it."