First Principles IASlearning from first principles

SCO, BRICS and Central Asia

Syllabus
Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.
As of
October 2026
  • Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
  • three evils
  • RATS
  • SECURE
  • BRICS
  • New Development Bank
  • Contingent Reserve Arrangement
  • BRICS expansion
  • Global South
  • de dollarisation
  • Connect Central Asia
  • India Central Asia Summit
  • INSTC
  • Ashgabat Agreement
  • Chabahar

The first principle

India is a member of groupings in which China and Russia are leading voices, not because it shares their worldview but because the places and issues these groups cover matter to India. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is India's seat at the table in Eurasia and Central Asia, where it has no land access, and BRICS is a platform for reshaping a world order whose rules were written by the West. India's strategy in both is the same: use them to widen its options and voice the Global South, while blocking anything that would turn them into instruments against India or against the West.

The core

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

  • Origins. The Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) came together in 1996 to settle border questions and build military confidence after the Soviet collapse. With Uzbekistan it became the SCO in June 2001, and its Charter was adopted in 2002.
  • Aims. The SCO aims to fight the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, through its Regional Anti Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, and to promote trade, energy, connectivity and cultural ties among its members. Its secretariat is in Beijing and decisions are taken by consensus.
  • Membership. India and Pakistan, observers since 2005, became full members at the Astana summit in June 2017; Iran joined in July 2023 at the summit chaired by India, and Belarus in July 2024, which took the membership to ten.
  • India's chair (2023). India hosted the summit virtually in July 2023 under the theme "Towards a SECURE SCO", using the idea Prime Minister Modi set out at Qingdao in 2018: Security, Economic development, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Environmental protection.
Timeline of the growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation from 1996 to 2024From the Shanghai Five to the SCO1996Shanghai Five: China, Russia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan2001SCO founded with Uzbekistan2002SCO Charter adopted; RATSlater set up in Tashkent2005India and Pakistan becomeobservers2017India and Pakistan fullmembers (Astana)2018SECURE idea set out by Indiaat Qingdao2023India chairs; Iran joins2024Belarus joins; ten members
Figure: How the SCO grew from a border settlement group into a Eurasian organisation of ten members.

BRICS

  • Origins. Brazil, Russia, India and China held the first BRIC summit at Yekaterinburg in June 2009, and South Africa joined in 2010 to make BRICS. The group has no charter or secretariat, and the chair rotates each year.
  • Institutions. At Fortaleza in 2014 the members set up the New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai and operational from 2015, in which the five founders hold equal shares, and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a pool of 100 billion dollars on which members can draw in a balance of payments crisis.
  • Expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined from January 2024 after being invited at Johannesburg in 2023; Saudi Arabia was invited but has not formally taken up membership, and Indonesia joined in January 2025. At Kazan in 2024 the group created a category of partner countries, which includes states such as Malaysia, Thailand, Kazakhstan and Nigeria.
  • India's chair. India holds the BRICS chair in 2026, its fourth time after 2012, 2016 and 2021.
Hierarchy of BRICS showing its institutions and its members by stage of joiningBRICS: institutions and membersBRICSFoundersBrazil, Russia,India, China(2009)South Africa(2010)Joined 2024 and2025Egypt, Ethiopia,Iran, UAEIndonesia (2025)New DevelopmentBankAgreed 2014,working from 2015Equal foundershares; ShanghaiContingentReserveArrangement100 billiondollar poolBackstop forpayment crises
Figure: The growth of BRICS from four founders to an expanded group with its own bank and reserve pool.

Dimensions

Conflicts inside the SCO and India's role

  • Rivalries among members. The SCO contains the India Pakistan dispute over terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir, the India China standoff on the boundary since 2020, the quiet competition between China and Russia for influence in Central Asia, and the border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 and 2022. Consensus makes it easy for any one of them to block action.
  • India's response on terrorism. India keeps cross border terrorism at the centre of SCO debate. In June 2025 its Defence Minister refused to sign the SCO defence ministers' joint statement at Qingdao because it left out the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025, and the declaration of the Tianjin summit in September 2025 went on to condemn that attack.
  • India's response on connectivity. India alone among members has refused to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in SCO declarations, since its flagship, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, passes through Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir, which is Indian territory. India argues that connectivity must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, and offers alternatives such as Chabahar and the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
  • India's positive agenda. Through the SECURE theme, start ups and innovation, traditional medicine and the digital public infrastructure it offered as chair, India tries to give the SCO work that unites rather than divides members.
Table of conflicts inside the SCO and India's response to eachFault lines in the SCO andIndia's answerFault lineIndia's responseIndia andPakistan:terrorismKeeps terrorismcentral; refused 2025defence ministers'statementIndia andChina: boundaryDialogue on thesidelines; no BRIendorsementChina andRussia inCentral AsiaOffers a third partner,not a campKyrgyzstan andTajikistanborderSupports peacefulsettlementConsensus rulePositive agenda underSECURE
Figure: The conflicts that weaken the SCO, and the way India answers each.

Importance of the SCO for India

  • Access and energy. It is one of the few forums where India meets all Central Asian leaders together, in a region rich in oil, gas and uranium and close to Afghanistan.
  • Counter terrorism. RATS gives India a channel for intelligence sharing and joint exercises, and a platform to press Pakistan in front of its closest partners.
  • Eurasian balance. Membership keeps India in a forum that China and Russia would otherwise shape alone, and lets India talk to both on the sidelines even when bilateral ties are strained.

In practice

BRICS as a counterweight and voice of the Global South

  • Reform of global governance. BRICS has pressed for reform of quotas and voting in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, which were partly shifted toward emerging economies under the 2010 IMF quota reform, and for reform of the United Nations Security Council.
  • Alternative finance. The NDB lends for infrastructure and sustainable development without the policy conditions of Western lenders, and India has been among its largest borrowers; the CRA gives a backstop outside the IMF.
  • Local currency trade. Members are working on trade and payments in national currencies, and India itself allowed trade settlement in rupees in 2022; but India has said that de dollarisation is not its goal, and it values the dollar's stability.
  • Is it an alternative to the G7? Expanded BRICS now has a larger share of world population and, at purchasing power parity, of world output than the Group of Seven (G7), but it lacks the shared values, common institutions and policy coordination of the G7. It works best as a forum of voice rather than as a rival bloc.
  • Limits. China's economy is larger than that of all other members combined, which tilts the group; members range from democracies to theocracies; and India and Brazil resist turning BRICS into an anti Western platform, especially as Russia and Iran face sanctions.
Comparison of BRICS and the Group of SevenBRICS and the G7BRICSG7NatureDeveloping andemerging economiesAdvanced industrialdemocraciesCoherenceDiverse systems andinterestsShared values andalliancesInstitutionsNDB and CRAShape IMF and WorldBankAimVoice and reform ofglobal orderCoordinate theexisting order
Figure: How BRICS differs from the G7 in nature, institutions and coherence.

India and Central Asia

  • Policy frame. The Connect Central Asia policy (2012) aimed at political, security, economic and cultural ties; Prime Minister Modi visited all five Central Asian Republics in 2015; the India Central Asia Dialogue of foreign ministers began in 2019; and the first India Central Asia Summit, held virtually in January 2022 on thirty years of diplomatic ties, agreed to meet every two years and set up a joint working group on Chabahar.
  • Security. India shares concern over terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; it renovated the Ayni airbase near Dushanbe in the 2000s and holds joint exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
  • Energy. Kazakhstan, the world's largest uranium producer, and Uzbekistan supply uranium for India's nuclear plants; the Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) gas pipeline has stalled over security in Afghanistan and India Pakistan relations.
  • Connectivity. The INSTC, agreed by India, Iran and Russia in 2000, links Mumbai by sea to Iran and onward by rail and road to Central Asia and Russia. India operates a terminal at Iran's Chabahar port, under a ten year contract signed in May 2024, though the decision of the United States (US) in September 2025 to revoke the sanctions waiver it had granted in 2018, later eased by a temporary exemption, has added uncertainty.
  • Ashgabat Agreement. This 2011 agreement for a transport corridor, signed by Iran, Oman, Qatar, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Qatar later withdrew) and since joined by Kazakhstan and Pakistan, was joined by India in February 2018. It gives India a sea to land route from the Gulf of Oman into Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan and links with Chabahar and the INSTC.
Flowchart of India's connectivity routes to Central Asia through IranIndia's routes to Central Asia1Indian west coast portsMumbai, Kandla2Iran by seaChabahar and Bandar Abbas3INSTC northwardRail and road to the Caspian andRussia4Ashgabat corridor eastwardTurkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan5Central Asia without PakistanTrade, energy and access toAfghanistan
Figure: The three corridors that give India access to Central Asia without crossing Pakistan, and how they connect.

Outside powers in Central Asia and what Ashgabat means for India

  • Russia remains the security guarantor through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and India's close ties with Russia make it an acceptable partner.
  • China is the largest trader and investor through the BRI, roads, pipelines and loans, and India cannot match that money.
  • Turkey, the European Union (EU) and the US compete through language and culture, trade and earlier military access linked to Afghanistan.
  • Implication. Ashgabat lets India offer the Central Asian Republics another outlet to the sea and another partner, so that India competes on connectivity and trust, not on cash; but the route depends on Iran, sanctions and the condition of Afghanistan.
Two by two matrix placing outside powers in Central Asia by economic and security weightOutside powers in Central AsiaHigh security roleRussiaCSTO and basesMigrant labourlinksChinaBRI, pipelines,loansGrowing securitytiesIndiaTrust,connectivity,trainingAshgabat andChabaharTurkey, EU andUSCulture, tradeEarlier AfghanaccessLow economic weightHigh economic weightLow security role
Figure: The influence of major powers in Central Asia set against India's position.

Issues and way forward

  • Weak trade. India's trade with Central Asia remains small compared with China's, because there is no direct land route; India should push INSTC and Chabahar, add air freight corridors and fund projects through its lines of credit.
  • China in both groups. India should continue to block endorsement of the BRI and any wording that hurts its interests, while using the forums to keep channels with China open.
  • Expanded BRICS. A bigger group is harder to steer, so India should push for clear membership criteria and keep the focus on development, finance and reform rather than on confrontation with the West.
  • SCO effectiveness. India should keep insisting on consistent language on terrorism and use RATS for practical cooperation such as terror financing and drugs.

Common confusions

  • SCO and CSTO. The SCO is a broad cooperation body of ten members including India; the CSTO is a Russian led military alliance of which India is not a member.
  • NDB and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The NDB belongs to BRICS, with equal founding shares; the AIIB is a separate China led bank with many members, of which India is the second largest shareholder.
  • INSTC and Ashgabat. The INSTC runs north and south to Russia; Ashgabat is an east west corridor from the Gulf of Oman into Central Asia. Both connect through Iran.

For the exam

  • Keyword bank: three evils, RATS, SECURE, consensus, Pahalgam, BRI, New Development Bank, Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS expansion, partner countries, Global South, local currency trade, Connect Central Asia, INSTC, Ashgabat Agreement.
  • Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
  • Use in an answer:
    • Introduction with data: "With Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, the SCO grew to ten members, and with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE and Indonesia, BRICS has doubled since 2010."
    • Introduction with a statement: "Prime Minister Modi's SECURE framework, set out at Qingdao in 2018, made respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity a test for every connectivity project in the SCO."
    • Conclusion: "For India, the SCO and BRICS are not camps but platforms, used to widen its choices and speak for the Global South without being drawn into an anti Western bloc."
    • Conclusion: "In Central Asia India cannot outspend China, so its advantage lies in trust, connectivity through Chabahar and the INSTC, and partnership without dependence."