India, Sri Lanka, Maldives and the island states

The first principle

India's southern neighbours are islands that sit on the busiest sea routes of the Indian Ocean, so for India they are both neighbours and the front line of its maritime security. Whoever has influence in Colombo, Male, Port Louis or Victoria can watch, help or obstruct the flow of oil and trade on which India's economy runs. India's approach, set out as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) in 2015, is to be the partner these states call first, in a crisis and in development, so that they have no need to lean on rival powers.

The core

Sri Lanka: closeness and its complications

• Civilisational ties. Buddhism reached Sri Lanka from India through Mahinda in Ashoka's time, and the Tamil population of the north and east shares language and culture with Tamil Nadu, so domestic politics in both countries shapes the relationship.
• The Indo Sri Lanka Accord (1987). Signed by Rajiv Gandhi and J. R. Jayewardene during the civil war, it promised devolution to provinces, which Sri Lanka enacted as the Thirteenth Amendment (1987), and an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce a ceasefire. The IPKF ended up fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and withdrew in 1990. India's consistent position since is full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, including the land and police powers never devolved, within a united Sri Lanka.
• Katchatheevu and fishermen. Under the 1974 agreement on the boundary in historic waters, the islet of Katchatheevu lies on Sri Lanka's side, with Indian pilgrims and fishermen allowed to visit it; agreements in 1976 extended the boundary into the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal. The live issue today is that Indian trawlers fish in Sri Lankan waters, damaging the catch of Tamil fishermen in the north and leading to frequent arrests, which a joint working group on fisheries tries to manage.
• Free trade. The India Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1998 and in force from 2000, was India's first free trade agreement, and India is among Sri Lanka's largest sources of tourists and investment.

Maldives: the nearest island neighbour

• India as first responder. In Operation Cactus (November 1988), Indian troops reversed a coup attempt against President Gayoom within hours. India sent water by air and sea during the Male water crisis of December 2014 (Operation Neer), and was first with help after the 2004 tsunami and during the pandemic.
• The India Out phase. An "India Out" campaign by the opposition gathered force, and President Mohamed Muizzu, elected in September 2023, asked India to withdraw the military personnel who flew its helicopters and a Dornier aircraft for medical evacuation and surveillance. By May 2024 they were replaced by Indian civilian technical staff, and the Maldives did not renew a 2019 hydrography agreement.
• The reset. Economic stress brought the Maldives back. In October 2024 India agreed a currency swap of 400 million dollars and 30,000 crore rupees and the two adopted a vision for a Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership. In July 2025 the Indian Prime Minister was guest of honour at the sixtieth anniversary of Maldivian independence, with a new line of credit and the launch of talks on a free trade agreement.
• Projects. The Greater Male Connectivity Project, a bridge and causeway linking Male with Villingili, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi, is the largest infrastructure project in the Maldives and is financed by India with a grant and a line of credit. India also funds the Hanimaadhoo airport, and a 2021 agreement provides for a coast guard harbour and dockyard at Uthuru Thila Falhu.

Dimensions

• Geostrategic. The Maldives runs in a chain from just south of Lakshadweep to just south of the equator. The Eight Degree Channel separates it from Minicoy, and the One and a Half Degree Channel crosses it, and ships between the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca pass through or close to these channels or round Sri Lanka's south coast. Most of India's crude oil comes from the Gulf along these routes, and about 95 per cent of India's trade by volume moves by sea.
• Security. A hostile naval or surveillance presence on these islands would sit inside India's maritime backyard. Chinese research and survey ships calling at Sri Lankan ports, such as the Yuan Wang 5 at Hambantota in August 2022, worry India because they can map the seabed and track missiles; Sri Lanka imposed a pause on such visits in 2024.
• Economic and debt. Hambantota port was leased to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017 after Sri Lanka could not service its loans, and Chinese money also built the Colombo Port City. India offers grants, lines of credit and currency swaps on softer terms.
• Competition. China seeks ports and influence; the United States signed a defence framework with the Maldives in 2020, which India welcomed; Gulf states and Turkey add money and arms. India's advantage is proximity: it can arrive first in any crisis.
• Regional stability. Instability in an island state, whether economic collapse, a coup or a natural disaster, spills into the sea lanes and can invite outside intervention, so India's help also serves its own interest in a calm neighbourhood.

In practice

Sri Lanka's 2022 crisis

• What happened. In 2022 Sri Lanka ran out of foreign exchange, defaulted on its external debt and faced shortages of fuel, food and medicine, and mass protests forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to resign.
• India's response. India gave about 4 billion dollars in 2022 through credit lines for fuel, food and medicine, a currency swap and deferred payments under the Asian Clearing Union. In January 2023 India became the first bilateral creditor to give the International Monetary Fund (IMF) financing assurances for debt restructuring, which opened the way to the IMF programme approved in March 2023. This is the clearest recent proof of India as an "age old friend": it acted first and at scale while others waited.
• After the crisis. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, elected in September 2024, made India his first foreign visit in December 2024. During the Indian Prime Minister's visit in April 2025 the two countries signed their first memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation and agreed to develop Trincomalee as an energy hub, with the United Arab Emirates as a partner.

The island states and the security architecture

• Mauritius. Most Mauritians are of Indian origin. India built an airstrip and jetty on Agalega island, inaugurated in February 2024, for connectivity and maritime surveillance. India backed Mauritius on the Chagos Archipelago, where the International Court of Justice advised in 2019 that Britain should end its administration; in May 2025 Britain and Mauritius signed a treaty recognising Mauritian sovereignty, with the Diego Garcia base leased back to Britain. In March 2025 India widened SAGAR into MAHASAGAR, Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions.
• Seychelles. A 2015 agreement, revised in 2018, to develop facilities on Assumption Island stalled in the Seychelles legislature, but India supplies patrol vessels and aircraft and a coastal radar station.
• Colombo Security Conclave. It began in 2011 as a maritime security dialogue of the national security advisers of India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, was revived in 2020, and later added Mauritius and Bangladesh as members, with a secretariat in Colombo. It works on five pillars: maritime safety and security, terrorism and radicalisation, trafficking and organised crime, cyber security, and disaster relief.
• Information Fusion Centre Indian Ocean Region (IFC IOR). Set up by the Indian Navy at Gurugram in December 2018, it shares data on merchant shipping with partner navies through liaison officers, and is the practical core of India's role as a security provider.

Issues and way forward

• Domestic politics on both sides. The Tamil question and fishermen's arrests in Sri Lanka, and India Out sentiment in the Maldives, can derail ties. The fishermen issue needs a shift from bottom trawling to deep sea fishing with support to Tamil Nadu fishermen, and India should keep its aid visible to people, not only to governments.
• Debt and China. India cannot match Chinese finance project for project. It can offer quicker, smaller, visible projects, crisis support and partnerships with Japan, the United States, Australia and the Gulf, as in the Trincomalee energy hub.
• Sovereignty sensitivities. Military presence of any kind becomes a political target in small democracies. Civilian staffing, joint ownership of facilities and transparent agreements reduce suspicion.
• Delivery. Agreements such as Assumption Island stalled because they were seen as imposed. Regional formats such as the Colombo Security Conclave spread ownership, which makes them more durable.

Common confusions

• SAGAR and MAHASAGAR. SAGAR (2015) is India's vision for the Indian Ocean region; MAHASAGAR (2025) widens it to partnership with the Global South across regions.
• Katchatheevu and the fishermen issue. Katchatheevu is a settled boundary question from 1974; the fishermen issue is about trawling in Sri Lankan waters, which would continue whoever held the islet.
• Hambantota and Colombo Port City. Hambantota is a port leased to a Chinese firm after debt troubles; Colombo Port City is reclaimed land for a financial district built with Chinese investment.
• Eight Degree and Nine Degree Channels. The Nine Degree Channel separates Minicoy from the rest of Lakshadweep; the Eight Degree Channel separates Minicoy from the Maldives.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: SAGAR, MAHASAGAR, Neighbourhood First, first responder, Indo Sri Lanka Accord, Thirteenth Amendment, Katchatheevu, debt restructuring, Hambantota, Operation Cactus, India Out, Greater Male Connectivity Project, sea lanes of communication, Colombo Security Conclave, Information Fusion Centre.
• Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: "About 95 per cent of India's trade by volume moves by sea, and much of it passes the Maldives and Sri Lanka, which is why India treats these islands as the first ring of its maritime security."
  • Introduction with a report or event: "In 2022 India gave Sri Lanka about 4 billion dollars and became the first bilateral creditor to back its IMF programme, proving in a crisis the meaning of an age old friendship."
  • Conclusion: "India's influence in the island states will rest less on matching Chinese money than on being the partner that arrives first, respects sovereignty and builds what people can see."
  • Conclusion: "Through SAGAR, the Colombo Security Conclave and the Information Fusion Centre, India is turning its geography into a shared security system rather than a sphere of influence."