India, West Asia and energy security

The first principle

India imports most of the oil it burns, and most of that oil has come from the Gulf, where about nine million Indians also live and work. So West Asia is not a distant region for India but an extension of its economy: a petrol pump, a job market and a source of remittances, all in a neighbourhood prone to war. India's policy follows from this. It must keep good relations with rivals who distrust each other (the Gulf Arab states and Iran, Israel and the Palestinians) because its interests run through all of them.

The core

From Look West to Link West

• The old pattern. For decades India's ties with the region rested on oil purchases, workers and support for the Palestinian cause, with little strategic content. The Look West policy of 2005 began to change this, and since 2014 the Link West or Think West approach has turned buyer and seller ties into strategic partnerships with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Egypt and Israel at the same time.
• The Gulf as an economic partner. The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together form one of India's largest trading partners, supply much of its crude and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and have pledged large investments through their sovereign funds.
• People and remittances. India received about 129 billion US dollars of remittances in 2024, the highest of any country according to the World Bank, and the Gulf remains a large source of these even though the share from advanced economies such as the United States (US) has grown.

The Gulf partners

• UAE. A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership since 2017. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in February 2022 and in force from May 2022, was India's first such deal in a decade, and a 2023 agreement allows trade to be settled in rupees and dirhams. An Indian Institute of Technology Delhi campus opened in Abu Dhabi, and the UAE's national oil company stores crude in India's reserves.
• Saudi Arabia. The two set up a Strategic Partnership Council in October 2019, led at the level of the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince. It is a top crude supplier and a partner in refining, petrochemicals and the Haj.
• Qatar. It is India's largest LNG supplier, and in February 2024 Petronet LNG renewed its long term contract with QatarEnergy for twenty years beyond 2028.
• Oman. A long standing defence partner, Oman gave the Indian Navy access to the port of Duqm on the Arabian Sea in 2018.

Dimensions

Energy security as the core interest

• The scale of dependence. India is the world's third largest consumer of oil and imports more than 85 per cent of its crude, according to the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC). Any war in the Gulf or closure of the Strait of Hormuz therefore raises India's import bill, inflation and current account deficit at once.
• Diversified sources. India now buys from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Russia and the US, among more than thirty countries, so that no single crisis can choke supply. Russia overtook Iraq and Saudi Arabia as the largest single supplier after 2022 because of discounted prices, which shows how quickly diversification can work.
• Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL) holds 5.33 million tonnes of crude in underground rock caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur, enough for roughly nine to ten days of national consumption; a second phase at Chandikhol and Padur has been approved.
• Equity abroad. ONGC Videsh, the overseas arm of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, owns stakes in fields abroad, including a share of the Lower Zakum offshore field in Abu Dhabi bought by an Indian consortium in 2018.
• The transition. A target of 500 gigawatts of non fossil capacity by 2030, the National Green Hydrogen Mission (January 2023) and the International Solar Alliance (ISA), founded by India and France in 2015, aim to cut dependence on imported fuel over time. The Gulf states are also investing in renewables and hydrogen, so they can remain India's energy partners after oil.

Source: Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

Israel and Palestine

• Ties with Israel. India recognised Israel in 1950 but established full diplomatic relations only in January 1992. Israel is now a leading supplier of defence equipment (Barak air defence missiles, Heron drones, Phalcon airborne warning systems), and Indo Israel Centres of Excellence spread drip irrigation and protected farming in Indian states, while desalination and water reuse are other areas of cooperation.
• De hyphenation. In July 2017 Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel, raised ties to a strategic partnership, and did not combine the trip with a stop in Palestine; he visited Ramallah separately in February 2018. India now deals with each on its own merits, which is why the relationship has a depth and diversity in defence, farming, water, technology and trade that would be hard to roll back.
• Support for Palestine. India was the first non Arab state to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1974 and recognised the State of Palestine in 1988. It supports a two state solution, with a sovereign, independent and viable Palestine living side by side in peace with Israel, and funds the UN agency for Palestinian refugees.
• The Gaza war. India called the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 a terrorist attack, while also calling for the protection of civilians, sending medical and relief supplies to Gaza through Egypt, and supporting a ceasefire, which shows its balance between the two relationships.

In practice

Iran and the nuclear deal

• Shared interests. Iran was once one of India's top three crude suppliers, and its Chabahar port, where India Ports Global has run the Shahid Beheshti terminal since 2018, gives India a route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. It is also a link in the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to Russia.
• The nuclear deal and its collapse. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 between Iran and six powers limited Iran's nuclear programme in return for the lifting of sanctions. The US withdrew in May 2018 and reimposed sanctions, and when its waivers ended in May 2019 India stopped buying Iranian oil.
• Effect on India. India lost a nearby supplier that offered good credit terms, Chabahar and the INSTC slowed even though the US had exempted Chabahar in 2018 for its Afghan role (in September 2025 the US announced that it would revoke this exemption), and every crisis raised oil prices and fears for Indians in the region. In June 2025 Israel struck Iran, the US hit Iranian nuclear sites, and India evacuated its citizens from both countries under Operation Sindhu.
• India's response. India has kept talking to both Tehran and Washington, signed a ten year agreement on Chabahar in May 2024, backed dialogue over force, and protected its people, which is strategic autonomy in practice.

Corridors, groupings and evacuations

• India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Agreed through a memorandum of understanding at the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in New Delhi in September 2023 by India, the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the European Union, France, Germany and Italy, it would link India by sea to the Gulf, by rail across Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel's Haifa port, and on to Europe, with power cables, hydrogen pipelines and data cables alongside. The Gaza war has slowed it.
• I2U2. India, Israel, the UAE and the US formed this group in 2021 and held their first leaders' summit in July 2022, focusing on food security and clean energy projects in India (see the note on the Indo Pacific and minilaterals).
• Evacuations. Operation Rahat (2015) brought more than four thousand Indians and several hundred foreign nationals out of Yemen, Operation Ajay (October 2023) brought Indians home from Israel, and Operation Sindhu (June 2025) evacuated them from Iran and Israel.

Issues and way forward

• Rivalry among partners. Saudi Arabia and Iran, Israel and Iran, and Israel and the Arab states all compete, and India risks being caught between them. Dealing with each on its own merits, as with Israel and Palestine, and avoiding military alignments, keeps its options open.
• Vulnerable workers. Indian workers in the Gulf face wage theft, withheld passports and poor housing. The eMigrate system, labour agreements with host states and a ready evacuation plan for each crisis are the answer.
• Sanctions risk. US sanctions on Iran and Russia can cut off cheap oil and stall Chabahar and the INSTC, so India needs payment systems in local currencies and diplomacy to secure exemptions.
• Energy transition. Long term LNG contracts, Gulf investment in Indian refining and reserves, and partnerships on green hydrogen and solar power can make West Asia India's partner in the transition rather than only its oil supplier.

Common confusions

• Link West and Look East. Link West is India's approach to the Gulf and West Asia; Look East and Act East face Southeast and East Asia.
• IMEC and INSTC. IMEC runs west from India through the Gulf and Israel to Europe; INSTC runs north from India through Iran to Russia.
• De hyphenation and abandonment. De hyphenation means separate relations with Israel and Palestine, not dropping support for a Palestinian state.
• SPR and commercial stocks. Strategic reserves are a government buffer for emergencies; refineries also hold their own commercial stocks, which add to the total days of cover.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: Link West, energy security, import dependence, diversification, strategic petroleum reserves, India UAE CEPA, Strategic Partnership Council, remittances, de hyphenation, two state solution, Chabahar, JCPOA, IMEC, I2U2, evacuation operations.
• Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: "India imports more than 85 per cent of its crude oil and received about 129 billion US dollars in remittances in 2024 (World Bank), much of both linked to West Asia, which makes the region an extension of India's economy."
  • Introduction with a landmark: "When Narendra Modi visited Israel in 2017 without stopping in Ramallah, India signalled that it would deal with Israel and Palestine separately, each on its own merits."
  • Conclusion: "Energy security in the coming years will depend less on where India buys oil than on how widely it spreads its suppliers, reserves and partners, from long term LNG contracts to green hydrogen with the Gulf."
  • Conclusion: "India's strength in West Asia is that it is a friend to rivals, and keeping that position through each crisis protects its oil, its trade and its nine million citizens in the Gulf."