Left wing extremism

The first principle

An armed movement that claims to speak for the poor can survive only as long as some of the poor believe it, and as long as the state is not there to offer them something better. Left wing extremism grew in forested tribal districts where land was lost, forest laws pressed hard and the administration was far away, and it shrank when the state arrived with both a police station and a road. The lesson of its rise and decline is that security clears the ground but only development and rights hold it.

The core

What it is and what it wants

• The ideology. Left wing extremism (LWE) in India follows the Maoist idea of a protracted people's war: build bases among the rural poor, create liberated zones where the state cannot enter, and then encircle the cities from the countryside. Its stated aim is to overthrow the Indian state by armed force, so it rejects elections and the Constitution.
• The main organisation. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed on 21 September 2004 by the merger of the People's War Group, based in Andhra Pradesh, and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, based in Bihar and Jharkhand. Its armed wing is the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army, and the party and its front organisations were banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in 2009.
• How it sustained itself. The movement raised money by extortion from contractors, mining companies and traders in forest produce such as tendu leaves, and it used front organisations among students, workers and cultural groups to recruit and to shape opinion.

Why it spread where it did

• Land and forests. Tribal families lost land to moneylenders and to projects, while colonial era forest laws turned the collection of firewood and minor produce into an offence; the Planning Commission's Expert Group of 2008 named land alienation, displacement and forest restrictions among the main causes.
• An absent state. In the deep forests of Bastar or the Saranda region, a village might never see a teacher, a doctor or a revenue official, and the armed group filled the gap with its own courts and rules.
• Geography. Dense forest, hills and the junctions of State boundaries gave cover and let squads slip from one police jurisdiction to another, which is why the movement settled along a belt of forests that came to be called the Red Corridor.

Dimensions

• Security. At its height the movement fought a guerrilla war with ambushes and landmines; the attack near Tadmetla in Dantewada district in April 2010, in which 76 security personnel were killed, showed what poor intelligence and road bound movement could cost.
• Governance. Every school building blown up and every road left unbuilt kept the state away, so the contest was really over who governs a village.
• Economic. The affected districts hold much of India's coal, iron ore and bauxite, so mining brought both revenue and displacement, and extortion from mining and contracts kept the armed group funded.
• Tribal rights. The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 (PESA) and the Forest Rights Act 2006 gave tribal communities a say over their land and forests, and how faithfully they were applied decided whether people trusted the state.
• Human rights. Civilians were caught between the two sides. In Nandini Sundar v State of Chhattisgarh (2011) the Supreme Court held that arming local tribal youth as special police officers, as done during the Salwa Judum campaign that began in 2005, was unconstitutional, and ordered such forces disbanded.
• Federal. The war crossed State lines, so the Union funded and coordinated while each State led operations; Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds, raised in 1989, showed that a well trained State force with local intelligence works best.

In practice

The strategy

• The National Policy and Action Plan (2015). The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) drew up this plan, which combines security measures, development, the protection of tribal rights and public perception management and makes the Union and the States share both planning and cost.
• SAMADHAN (2017). Announced by the Union Home Minister in May 2017, it lists eight elements: smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation and training, actionable intelligence, dashboard based key indicators, harnessing technology, an action plan for each theatre, and no access to financing.
• Security support. The Security Related Expenditure scheme repays States for operations, training, the rehabilitation of those who surrender and ex gratia payments; the MHA reports several hundred fortified police stations built and new camps of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) pushed deep into former strongholds, with the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), raised in 2008, as the jungle warfare spearhead.
• Development support. Special Central Assistance fills critical gaps in the worst districts; the Road Requirement Plan and the Road Connectivity Project for LWE Affected Areas have built thousands of kilometres of roads; and thousands of mobile towers, bank branches, post offices and Eklavya Model Residential Schools followed the roads.
• Cutting the money. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the Enforcement Directorate have attached assets of the movement's leaders and fronts, applying the idea that an armed group without money cannot keep its cadres.
• Surrender and rehabilitation. Cadres who surrender receive a grant, a monthly stipend while they train for a trade and extra payment for weapons handed in; the MHA reports 2,337 surrenders in 2025 alone.

The result

• The decline in numbers. Incidents of violence peaked at 1,936 in 2010 and fell to 234 in 2025, according to MHA figures. The number of affected districts fell from 126 to 90 in April 2018, partly through a reclassification, then to 38 by April 2024, 18 by March 2025 and 8 by December 2025.
• The final push. In August 2024 the Union Home Minister set 31 March 2026 as the date to end LWE. Operations in 2025 killed the general secretary of the CPI (Maoist) and several of its top leaders, and the last three most affected districts in October 2025 were Bijapur, Sukma and Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh.
• Where it stands. The MHA told the Rajya Sabha on 29 July 2026 that the country has become free of left wing extremism, that the count of affected districts reached zero in March 2026 and that no district is now classed as LWE affected. It still keeps 37 districts under a Legacy and Thrust category for continued security and development support and one district as a District of Concern, and it is converting some security camps into Jan Suvidha Kendras, or public service centres.

Issues and way forward

• The risk of relapse. An ideology does not die with its cadres, and the grievances that fed it, over land, displacement and forests, have not vanished; keeping the Legacy and Thrust districts on development priority and watching for regrouping across State borders is the safeguard.
• Rehabilitation that lasts. Former cadres need jobs, safety from reprisal and a place in village life, or some will drift back; skill training tied to real employment and follow up over years matter more than a one time grant.
• Rights on paper and on the ground. Forest rights claims rejected without reason and gram sabha consultation under PESA treated as a formality reopen old wounds; transparent claim processing and genuine consent for mining and projects are the remedy.
• From camps to services. A security camp that becomes a centre for schooling, health and banking turns a symbol of force into a symbol of the state's care, which is why the conversion into Jan Suvidha Kendras matters.
• Police capacity. States must keep the trained forces and intelligence networks they built, rather than withdrawing them as soon as violence stops, so that any revival can be caught early.
• Urban fronts and online spaces. Recruitment and propaganda can shift to cities and the internet; lawful monitoring under UAPA, with care not to criminalise legitimate dissent, is the balance the courts expect.

Common confusions

• Naxalism and Maoism. Naxalism is the older term from the Naxalbari uprising of 1967 and covers all the groups that grew from it; Maoism refers to the CPI (Maoist) of 2004 and its ideology, which became the main stream of the movement.
• LWE affected districts and most affected districts. Affected districts were all those with LWE activity that qualified for support schemes, while most affected districts were the small subset with most of the violence; both counts fell to zero by March 2026.
• Security Related Expenditure and Special Central Assistance. The first repays States for the costs of fighting extremism; the second funds public infrastructure and services in the worst affected districts.
• Salwa Judum and the State's own forces. Salwa Judum was a campaign that armed local villagers as auxiliaries, which the Supreme Court struck down in 2011; regular State police and specialised units such as the Greyhounds and the CoBRA are trained, accountable forces.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: Naxalbari 1967, CPI (Maoist), protracted people's war, Red Corridor, development deficit, land alienation, SAMADHAN, National Policy and Action Plan 2015, fortified police stations, Security Related Expenditure, Special Central Assistance, Forest Rights Act, PESA, surrender and rehabilitation, Legacy and Thrust districts.
• Previous year questions: Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: Districts affected by left wing extremism fell from 126 to none by March 2026, and incidents fell from 1,936 in 2010 to 234 in 2025, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs.
  • Introduction with a judgment: In Nandini Sundar v State of Chhattisgarh (2011) the Supreme Court held that the state cannot fight extremism by arming poorly trained villagers, placing the rule of law at the centre of counter insurgency.
  • Conclusion: Left wing extremism was pushed back by a road, a mobile tower and a police station arriving together; keeping it out depends on forest rights, schools and jobs that make the armed path pointless.
  • Conclusion: The end of affected districts is a milestone, not a finish line, and the Legacy and Thrust districts will show whether development can hold what security has cleared.