Security in Jammu and Kashmir

The first principle

Security in Jammu and Kashmir is a contest over two things at once: territory, which a hostile neighbour claims, and the loyalty of the people, which that neighbour tries to turn against the state. Pakistan cannot take the territory by war, so it uses local grievance as a lever and armed proxies as the tool, and it keeps the cost low by denying its role. It follows that the answer is never only military: the border has to be sealed, the militant network broken and the population given reasons to trust the state, all at the same time.

The core

Territory and status

• The legal basis. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, and India holds that the whole of the former State is an integral part of India. Parliament's unanimous resolution of 22 February 1994 restated this and called on Pakistan to vacate the areas it occupies.
• The parts India does not control. Pakistan occupies Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) and Gilgit Baltistan; China occupies Aksai Chin; and in 1963 Pakistan illegally ceded the Shaksgam valley to China under an agreement India does not recognise. India objects to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) because it runs through Gilgit Baltistan.
• The Union Territories since 2019. In August 2019 Presidential orders made Article 370 inoperative, and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 created two Union Territories (UTs) from 31 October 2019: Jammu and Kashmir with a legislature, and Ladakh without one. On India's official map PoJK lies in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir, while Gilgit Baltistan and Aksai Chin lie in the UT of Ladakh. The Supreme Court upheld the change in In Re Article 370 (December 2023), directed Assembly elections, and recorded the Centre's assurance that statehood would be restored.

What the threat is

• Cross border terrorism as proxy war. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) are trained and launched from Pakistan and PoJK, so a fighter killed is replaced from across the Line of Control (LoC), and the conflict cannot be ended from inside Jammu and Kashmir alone.
• Four phases. A local insurgency led by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) began in 1989 after the disputed election of 1987; from the mid 1990s foreign militants and suicide attacks took over; from 2008 to 2016 street protests, stone pelting and young militants who recruited through social media dominated; and since 2019 the pattern has been hybrid, with small cells, front names and attacks on soft targets.
• The hybrid militant. This is a person on no police list who carries out a single attack and then returns to normal life, which makes the old method of tracking known militants far less useful. Overground workers (OGWs), who give shelter, information and logistics without carrying arms, are the network such people depend on.
• Front names. Since 2019 attacks have been claimed by names such as The Resistance Front (TRF), which India treats as a front of LeT and banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), so that the parent group and its sponsor can deny their hand.

Dimensions

• Security. Infiltration across the LoC and the International Border, tunnels and drones that drop arms and narcotics, and the shift of attacks from 2021 to 2024 to the forests of Rajouri, Poonch, Reasi, Kathua and Doda in the Jammu region all stretch a grid that was built for the Kashmir valley.
• Political. Assembly elections were held in September and October 2024 and an elected government took office that October, so the question now is how to restore statehood while keeping internal security under the Centre. High turnout in the 2024 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections is read as public confidence in the ballot.
• Economic. Tourism, horticulture and handicrafts carry the economy, and terrorists attack tourists and outside workers precisely because their presence signals normality; the Prime Minister's Development Package of 2015 and the new Central industrial scheme of 2021 aim to create jobs that drain the pool of recruits.
• Social. Radicalisation through social media, drug abuse that funds and feeds militancy, the return of displaced Kashmiri Pandits and the safety of minorities and migrant workers are long term tasks that policing alone cannot solve.
• Legal and rights. The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990 (AFSPA), the Public Safety Act 1978 and internet suspensions give the state wide power, and in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020) the Supreme Court held that an internet shutdown must be temporary, necessary and proportionate, and must be published and reviewed.
• International. Pakistan raises Kashmir abroad as political cover for its proxy war, while China's hold on Aksai Chin and its corridor through Gilgit Baltistan make Ladakh a frontier with two neighbours.

In practice

Cases and their lessons

• Kargil, 1999. Pakistani soldiers posing as militants occupied heights in the Kargil sector and were evicted by the Army and the Air Force; the Kargil Review Committee, chaired by K Subrahmanyam, found serious intelligence gaps, and the reforms that followed through a Group of Ministers created the Defence Intelligence Agency and the Multi Agency Centre in the Intelligence Bureau.
• Uri, 2016. After an attack on an Army camp at Uri in September 2016, India carried out surgical strikes on launch pads across the LoC on 29 September 2016 and announced them publicly, a break from the earlier practice of restraint.
• Pulwama, 2019. A suicide bomber of JeM killed 40 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on 14 February 2019, and India struck a JeM camp at Balakot in Pakistan on 26 February 2019; the lesson was that convoys need protected routes and that the response could cross the LoC itself.
• Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor, 2025. In the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, terrorists killed 26 people, most of them tourists, at Baisaran meadow. India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and, in Operation Sindoor on the night of 6 and 7 May 2025, struck nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and PoJK, including the JeM headquarters at Bahawalpur and the LeT centre at Muridke; firing stopped on 10 May 2025 after talks between the Directors General of Military Operations. The Prime Minister then stated that India would answer any attack on its own terms, would not accept nuclear blackmail and would make no distinction between terrorists and their sponsors.

Institutions, law and programmes

• The grid. The Army's Rashtriya Rifles (raised 1990) and its formations on the LoC, the Border Security Force (BSF) on the International Border, the CRPF and the Jammu and Kashmir Police with its Special Operations Group work together, with a Unified Headquarters to coordinate them.
• The money trail. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) registered a terror funding case against separatist leaders in 2017, and JKLF leader Yasin Malik was sentenced to life imprisonment in such a case in 2022; the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jammu and Kashmir) and the JKLF were banned under UAPA in 2019.
• People and development. Village Defence Guards arm and train villagers in remote areas of Jammu; the Army's Operation Sadbhavana runs schools and health camps; and the surrender and rehabilitation policy gives a way out to those who give up arms.

Issues and way forward

• Hybrid militants and thin intelligence. Small cells with no record leave little to track, so human intelligence in villages, digital tracking of handlers and steady work on the overground network matter more than big operations.
• The Jammu region. Dense forests and a thinner troop presence, after forces were moved to eastern Ladakh in 2020, gave small groups room there, so the grid has had to be rebuilt with more troops, Village Defence Guards and better patrolling.
• The border. Tunnels and drones defeat a fence alone, so the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System, which joins sensors, cameras and quick reaction teams, and anti drone systems need to cover the whole border; the border management note covers this.
• Trust. Detentions, internet suspensions and the long wait for statehood can feed the very alienation that recruiters use, so restoring statehood on a clear timeline, keeping elected bodies working and holding forces to account where rights are violated strengthen security rather than weaken it.
• The sponsor. As long as camps across the LoC survive, local gains can be reversed, so diplomatic, financial and, where needed, military pressure on the sponsor has to be kept up; the external actors note covers this.

Common confusions

• LoC, International Border and LAC. The LoC divides the UT of Jammu and Kashmir from PoJK and is guarded mainly by the Army; the International Border in the Jammu region is guarded by the BSF; and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China runs along Ladakh.
• PoJK and Gilgit Baltistan. Both are occupied by Pakistan, but India's map places PoJK in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan in the UT of Ladakh.
• Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles. The Rashtriya Rifles is part of the Army, raised in 1990 for counter terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, while the Assam Rifles is a central armed police force under the Ministry of Home Affairs that serves mainly in the North East.
• AFSPA and the Public Safety Act. The first gives the armed forces powers in a disturbed area, while the second lets the administration detain a person without trial to prevent a threat to security or public order.

For the exam

• Keyword bank: proxy war, cross border terrorism, Line of Control, infiltration, hybrid militant, overground worker, front organisations, PoJK, Gilgit Baltistan, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019, Rashtriya Rifles, terror funding, Village Defence Guards, whole of government approach, Operation Sindoor.
• Previous year questions: Practise the previous year questions on this topic →
• Use in an answer:
  • Introduction with data: Terrorist initiated incidents in Jammu and Kashmir fell from 228 in 2018 to 125 in 2022, and security personnel killed fell from 91 to 32 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2023), yet the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025 showed that the threat has changed form rather than ended.
  • Introduction with a judgement: In In Re Article 370 (2023) the Supreme Court upheld the reorganisation of the State into two Union Territories and recorded the assurance that statehood would be restored.
  • Conclusion: Security in Jammu and Kashmir needs both a sealed border and a satisfied people, so the grid, the courts and the ballot box have to work together.
  • Conclusion: India's response since 2016 shows a shift from absorbing attacks to raising the cost for the sponsor, but lasting peace will come only when development and trust drain the pool from which militants are recruited.